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INTRODUCTION
In October of 2009, two employees from for-profit University of
Phoenix visited a homeless shelter in Cleveland to recruit students for
enrollment. 1 Men like Benson Rollins, an unemployed, recovering
alcoholic and high school dropout who had been homeless for ten months,
received repeated phone calls and emails urging him to register for classes. 2
Not to be outdone by the University of Phoenix, administrators at for-profit
Chancellor’s School of Professional Studies invited managers of Cleveland
social service agencies to a lunch to discuss “new plans to recruit the
economically disadvantaged and at-risk groups” through “on-site
recruitment at local transitional housing, halfway houses, and other human
service facilities.” 3 Do these two vignettes illustrate savvy and muchneeded business entrees into untapped markets or predatory behavior at the
expense of the vulnerable?
As in housing, healthcare, and even public financing, the reception of
the for-profit motive in higher education has been mixed. Supporters
celebrate the movement as promising, citing rapid growth in the industry as
affirmation of the good the institutions provide in responding to a niche
student market neglected by nonprofit institutions (NPIs). Detractors,
however, critique the movement as ultimately incompatible with notions of
public good and certain to produce casualties in the race to maximize
profit. Investigations have revealed that for-profit education has, indeed,
produced casualties, and that those casualties are disproportionately borne
by the disadvantaged: first-generation, minority, poor and working class,
and veteran students. Recruiters from the University of Phoenix, for
example, were not likely to explain to Benson Rollins that graduates of forprofit institutions of higher education (FPIs) bear a disproportionate
number of student loan defaults; that FPIs have gained a reputation for
fraud and abuse in recruiting and business practices; and that recruitment
officers at the schools are trained to target and prey upon the vulnerabilities
of students who consider their institutions.
The argument I make against FPIs is both practical and normative.
Regulation of the for-profit sector is ultimately futile because higher
education is difficult to define or measure, and legal recourse for a poorly
delivered education is often inadequate. Normatively, for-profit higher
education is the latest in a troubling trend of introducing market dynamics
and private interests into areas that should be shaped by a commitment to
public ideals and collective responsibility.
Part I explores the for-profit business model and the niche market the

1. See Daniel Golden, The Homeless at College, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK.,
April 30, 2010, at 64.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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industry targets. Part II establishes higher education as a public good
essential to promoting democracy and societal equality, and characterizes
for-profit higher education as the latest merge of private interest and public
good. In this merge, the for-profit motive undermines the public good of
higher education, and in pursuit of the federal monies to which low-income
students have access, FPIs capitalize on information asymmetries and
valuation problems in the sector. This strategy results in predatory
education—negative educational experiences, rent-seeking behavior, fraud,
deception, and the absence of legal remedies—at the expense of the public
and the marginalized student population for-profits purport to help. Part III
explores whether this market failure can be directly attributed to the forprofit motive, assesses the law’s current response to predatory education,
and notes the futility of regulation in the area. The article concludes that
the “problem is in the premises,” an issue that most of the literature on forprofit higher education has ignored. Accordingly, although the for-profit
sector might be able to educate students in a few limited areas, federal loan
monies are better spent to support programs administered through the
nonprofit sector where at least the absence of the for-profit motive
eliminates an incentive to exploit vulnerable students in pursuit of investor
wealth.
THE BIG BUSINESS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
“Not being comparable to a light-industry (having no product, in the
strict sense), nor to a store (having no sales-list of items for disposal), a
university is apt to confound the accounts. Profit and loss, cost and return
on capital are not easily calculable; indeed, there is something
inappropriate in making the calculations.”4
FPIs employ a business model that maximizes profits through operating
efficiencies and the receipt of federal student loans funds, all while
purporting to educate a niche student market.
A. The For-Profit Business Model
To call an institution for-profit or nonprofit 5 incorrectly implies that the
latter does not seek to maximize revenue. To the contrary, NPIs often
4. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, WHAT IS HISTORY? AND OTHER ESSAYS 373, 386
(Luke O’Sullivan ed., 2004).
5. The term “nonprofit institution” includes both public and private nonprofit
entities. It is obvious that public and private nonprofit colleges and universities
have different cost structures and internal constraints that dictate their behavior.
Moreover, substantial literature suggests that the very benefit of the private
nonprofit sector is its ability to be more responsive than the public sector to those
they serve because of the possibility of tailoring for particular patronage and the
absence of bureaucratic unwieldiness. Nevertheless, to the extent that both public
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aggressively pursue revenue, through “research contracts and grants, . . .
[and] royalty streams from licensing of intellectual property.”6 And, just as
FPIs exist to realize a profit, NPIs also work with “excess of revenues over
expenditures . . . .” 7 Although many of the terms and labels used to
describe the finance and governance of NPIs differ from those used to
describe the finance and governance of FPIs, the terms apply to
conceptually similar activities. For example, “donors” in the nonprofit
context might be considered analogous to “investors” in the for-profit
context, and “endowment” in the former context might be analogized to
“private investment capital” in the latter.8
Moreover, with NPIs
increasingly entering for-profit ventures that operate parallel to their
educational missions, the distinction between public and private in higher
education is blurring. The most significant factor, therefore, distinguishing
FPIs from NPIs is the nondistribution constraint. 9 NPIs are limited by the
prohibition on the distribution of net revenues through organizational
shares. Any net revenue must be reinvested in the institution. In contrast,
FPIs are not so constrained.
Although records detailing the origins of for-profit higher education are
scarce, proprietary schools existed among the American colonies, where
and private NPIs operate under a nondistribution constraint, to the extent that
federal legislation treats FPIs differently vis-à-vis public and private NPIs, and to
the extent that much of the literature examining the advantages and disadvantages
of for-profit education compares the sector to the public and private nonprofit
sector, this article uses the term “nonprofit” to encompass both public and private
nonprofit institutions of higher education.
6. WILLIAM G. TIERNEY & GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE, NEW PLAYERS,
DIFFERENT GAME: UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES 66 (2007).
7. RICHARD RUCH, HIGHER ED, INC.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT
UNIVERSITY 90 (2001). Harvard University, for example, generates a “profit” of
over hundreds of millions of dollars each year, while smaller, more modest NPIs
can generate profits of several thousand to several hundred dollars a year. Id.
8. TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 67.
9. Henry Hansmann first explained the “nondistribution constraint”
as follows:
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is
barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who
exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees .
. . . It should be noted that a nonprofit organization is not barred from
earning a profit . . . . It is only the distribution of the profits that is
prohibited. Net earnings, if any, must be retained and devoted in their
entirety to financing further production of the services that the
organization was formed to provide . . . . I shall call [this prohibition on
the distribution of profits] the “nondistribution constraint.”
See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838 (1980). See also RUCH, supra note 7, at 91.
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sole proprietors, usually trained as clergy, ran private schools for teaching
and tutoring. 10 Well into the nineteenth-century, basic skills in teaching,
medicine, law, and accounting were taught at proprietary institutions,
although the institutions were rarely degree-granting. 11
Moreover,
commercial schools offering training in new technologies like the
typewriter and stenographic machines proliferated at the turn of the
century. 12 These independent proprietary schools originally received no
public funding. 13 Eventually, political and cultural movements favoring
public vocational training curtailed the growth of proprietary education,
resulting in policy recommendations like the 1910 Flexner report, a study
which curtailed for-profit medical education programs and led to further
calls for regulation and oversight of the proprietary sector.14 With the rise
of the comprehensive research university, nonprofit education—both public
and private—dominated higher education until the Higher Education Act
(HEA) of 1972 made students of for-profit education institutions eligible
for participation in the federal financial aid program. 15
Fueled by both technology and organizational practices that enable the
provision of education at lower cost, as well as by the increasing size of the
college-age population, 16 enrollment at FPIs has grown faster than the rest
of higher education, averaging an increase of nine percent per year over the
last thirty years. 17 By for-profit, I mean those post-secondary educational
institutions that explicitly pursue profit from the educational services they
provide. These range from independent for-profit vocational programs, to
online education, to the for-profit colleges and universities that currently
dominate the field. Although NPIs today do engage in for-profit ventures, I
exclude in my scope NPIs that pursue profit through activities other than
academic instruction.
Today, FPIs educate about 1.4 million students,18 or seven percent of the
nineteen million students who enroll at degree-granting institutions each

10. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 91.
11. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES 5
(David W. Breneman et al. eds., 2006).
12. See id.
13. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 54.
14. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 5.
15. See id. at 5–6.
16. See id. at 6.
17. Jennifer Gonzalez, Federal Proposal Could Jeopardize For-Profit
Programs, Especially Bachelor’s Degrees, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 17,
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Federal-Proposal-on-Student/65604.
18. Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in
Deceptive and Questionable Marketing Practices: Hearing on For-Profit Schools:
The Student Recruitment Experience Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor
and Pensions, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Undercover Testing] (statement
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year, 19 the majority of whom complete two-year (or less) certification
programs. 20 Although prohibited from awarding liberal arts degrees,21
program offerings at FPIs include B.A., M.A., and Ph.D programs in areas
ranging from the culinary arts to psychology and teacher education. 22
Publicly traded companies must show consistent growth to maintain
their stock prices and satisfy investors, and the publicly traded FPIs have
been no exception. The number of publicly traded degree-granting
providers of higher education grew steadily throughout the 1990s, 23 and in
2010, the for-profit sector brought in $29.2 billion in revenue, compared to
just $9 billion in 2000. 24 Between 2000 and 2003, the largest eight FPIs
had the highest-performing stocks of any industry on the S&P stock index,
rising an incredible 460% during the period, as compared to a twenty-four
percent loss for the S&P 500 index. 25 As of July 2010, the fourteen largest
publicly traded FPIs were worth more than $26 billion, with rapid growth a
hallmark of their stocks.26
Because FPIs do not receive state support, virtually all income received
by the institutions is derived from student tuition. Although cheaper than
most private NPIs, 27 tuition at FPIs is generally more expensive than that of
public colleges and universities, including community colleges.28 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that in fourteen of
of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director Forensics Audits and Special
Investigations, United States Government Accountability Office).
19. Gonzalez, supra note 17.
20. EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 7.
21. Some scholars suggest that advocacy among FPIs for a single definition of
“postsecondary education” in the Higher Education Act, which would allow only a
small percentage of FPIs to compete for competitive institutional grants, is really
about the right to offer liberal arts degrees, rather than access to the additional
funding. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 163.
22. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 56; see also EARNINGS FROM
LEARNING, supra note 11, at 8–9.
23. EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 145.
24. Golden, supra note 1.
25. Melanie Hirsch, What's In a Name? The Definition of an Institution of
Higher Education and its Effect on For-Profit Postsecondary Schools, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 822 (2005).
26. Id.
27. See TIERNEY, & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 20. In 2010–11, in-state and
out-of-state tuition at public four-year colleges and universities averaged $7,605
and $19,595, respectively, while tuition at private four-year NPIs averaged
$27,293. COLLEGEBOARD ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., Trends in College Pricing
3 (2010), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/archives/CP_2010
.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
28. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 85–86. In 2010–11, community colleges had
an average annual tuition of $2,713, compared to $13,935 at FPIs. Trends In
College Pricing, supra note 27, at 3.
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fifteen FPIs researched, tuition was more expensive at the FPI than at the
closest public college or university, regardless of degree. 29 For-profit
tuition was more expensive than nearby private nonprofit colleges and
universities in four out of fifteen cases. 30 Similarly, certificates awarded at
the FPIs were often significantly more expensive than those offered at
nearby public colleges and universities. 31
When grant aid is considered, however, the unmet financial needs of
low-income students at FPIs can be higher than that of low-income students
at even private NPIs, which use institutional grants to defray costs, and
spend three and a half times more on each student than FPIs do. 32 There
are also several instances of for-profit tuition approaching the tuition of
elite private nonprofit universities. ITT Technical Institute charges
$40,000 for a two-year associate’s degree in computers and electronics; Le
Cordon Bleu College of Culinary Arts charges $41,000 for a 21-month
program. 33
To meet the high cost of tuition, students incur significant amounts of
debt. Borrowers who earned bachelor’s degrees from FPIs in 2007–2008
had a median debt of $32,653—significantly higher than the $22,375 and
$17,700 debt loads incurred by graduates of four year private and public
nonprofit colleges and universities, respectively. 34 Low-income attendees
in particular depend significantly on federal grants and loans to enroll.35
Driven by the increased enrollment of low-income students eligible for Pell
Grant awards at proprietary schools, federal aid to students at for-profit
colleges and universities jumped from $4.6 billion in 2000 to $26.5 billion
in 2009, with publicly traded FPIs deriving on average seventy-five percent
of their revenue from the federal funds.36 Career Education Corporation,
for example, reported $1.84 billion in revenue in 2009, with approximately

29. See Undercover Testing, supra note 18, at 16.
30. Id.
31. For example, a certificate in computer-aided drafting cost $13,945 at a
FPI, but only $520 at a nearby public college. See id. at 17.
32. At four-year FPIs, low-income students must finance almost $25,000 a
year, with only a twenty-two percent chance of graduation. In contrast, four-year,
private, nonprofit, low-income students must finance $16,600 a year, with a
graduation rate that is almost three times higher. See MAMIE LYNCH, JENNIFER
ENGLE & JOSÉ L. CRUZ, EDUC. TRUST, SUBPRIME OPPORTUNITY: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 3 (2010)
[hereinafter EDUC. TRUST], available at http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.
org/files/publications/files/ Subprime_report_1.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
33. See Peter S. Goodman, The New Poor - In Hard Times, Lured Into Trade
School and Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, at A1.
34. See Golden, supra note 1.
35. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 171.
36. See Golden, supra note 1.
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eighty percent of that revenue coming from federal loans and grants. 37
Apollo Group, parent company to University of Phoenix, derived eighty-six
percent of its revenue from federal funds in fiscal year 2009, more than
double the percent of revenue that the average private, nonprofit college or
university obtains from the same source. 38 In 2010, University of Phoenix
made history, becoming the first college in the history of the United States
to take in more than $1 billion worth of Pell Grant disbursements in a
single academic year. 39 Despite educating less than ten percent of students,
FPIs received close to twenty-five percent of Pell Grant and federal student
loan dollars in 2008, 40 and the Department of Education estimates that by
the end of the 2011–2012 school year, students at for-profit schools will
receive more than $10 billion in Pell grants. 41
The for-profit motive in higher education is premised on market
economics principles. The standard market model envisions a competitive
world of buyers and sellers, all of whom are said to “share equally all
relevant information (or ignorance) about the key factors determining
product quality and prices in the market.” 42 Socially, the collective
interests of buyers and sellers ensure the sale of products that consumers
want to purchase. Competition between sellers in the market incentivizes
sellers to use efficient production methods and management practices to
pass savings on to customers.
Private markets fully embrace the for-profit motive, while assuming that
risk of reputation damage will prevent exploitation by the sellers, and that
customers will refuse to knowingly buy an inferior product. Ultimately,
those sellers who provide the best product at the most reasonable price will
become successful, and those that produce inferior, unreasonably priced
products will be less patronized and pushed out of the market. Indeed, in
accordance with the typical market narrative, FPIs maximize profit, in part,
through low overhead and wage scales,43 the absence of faculty tenure,
streamlined pre-packaged curriculums, and low physical plant costs.44

37. See Goodman, supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. See Ben Miller, U of Phoenix Makes History, THE QUICK & THE ED (July
10, 2010), http://www.quickanded.com/2010/07/phoenix-makes-history.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2011).
40. Kelly Field & Jeffrey Brainard, Government Vastly Undercounts Defaults,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 16, 2010, at A1.
41. See Goodman, supra note 33, at A1.
42. ELLIOTT SCLAR, YOU DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 6–7 (2000).
43. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 11.
44. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 85–88, 119–20.
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B.A Niche Market
Minority, low-income, and first-generation students choose for-profit
post-secondary education at disproportionate rates. 45 For-profit students
also tend to be those “whose prior education experiences [were]
unsuccessful or unrewarding,” and who found traditional NPIs too large,
impersonal, and insistent on classes perceived by the students to be
unnecessary. 46 For-profit students are also more likely to have been underprepared for their academic experience at traditional institutions, resulting
in poor performance while there. 47 In response to this sense of alienation,
FPIs provide lock-step curriculums tailored specifically to student career
objectives. 48 FPIs also cater to adult learners. Only sixteen percent of
college and university students in 2004 fit the traditional full-time, living
on-campus, profile. 49
In 2006, of the nation’s fourteen million
undergraduate students, more than forty percent attended two-year
colleges, almost one-third were older than twenty-four years old, and forty
percent were enrolled part-time. 50
FPIs have also attracted veterans, who use G.I. Bill benefits to attend.
In 2007, nineteen percent of students who used the G.I. Bill education
benefits chose FPIs, compared to only six percent of all college and
university students who chose the same. 51 In contrast, only six percent of
G.I. Bill students attended private NPIs compared to twenty percent of all
college and university students who choose the schools. 52 Because forprofit colleges and universities are more expensive than community
colleges, and sometimes more expensive than even private colleges and
universities, the choice is not necessarily driven by cost. Rather, veterans
prefer the flexible schedules, close proximity to home and families, and
career-specific curriculums that FPIs offer. 53
45. See Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal of For-Profit Institutions,
CHANGE: MAG. HIGHER LEARNING, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 68, 69.
46. Id.
47. See id.; RUCH, supra note 7, at 32.
48. See Howard-Vital, supra note 45, at 68.
49. See Ann I. Morey, Globalization and the Emergence of For-Profit Higher
Education, 48 HIGHER EDUC. 131, 135 (2004).
50. See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUC., U.S. DEPT. EDUC., A TEST
OF LEADERSHIP: CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION xi (2006)
[hereinafter TEST OF LEADERSHIP].
51. Kelly Field et al., Cost, Convenience Drive Veterans' College Choices,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 2008, at A1.
52. Id.
53. See id. Sergeant Hawthorne, a staff sergeant in the Army Reserves, used
his education benefits to obtain an online degree from for-profit American Military
University, as he moved to four different states then to Iraq. He ultimately
transferred the credits to George Washington University, where he obtained a
bachelor’s degree. See Eric Lipton, Colleges That Recruit Veterans Garner Profits
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To the extent that FPIs provide rolling admissions, admit students
without the benefit of college and university entrance exams, provide
flexible course times and locations, and even award credit for “life
experiences” in lieu of academic performance, access to the institutions is
easier for academically underserved students.
Also, some of the
institutions have laudably provided programs in fields for which there is
unmet occupational demand that is likely to continue into the future.54
These are realities on which FPIs ground their efforts to resist increased
regulation, 55 and for which NPIs are partly to blame. Barring structural and
societal changes that will expand access for this niche market to traditional
NPIs, FPIs will likely continue to disproportionately serve this growing
segment of the student population who desire some sort of post-secondary
education or training. 56
PREDATORY EDUCATION
“There could be no education that was not at once for use in earning a
living and for use in living a life.”57
For-profit business models undermine the public good of higher
education, while failures in the for-profit sector destabilize its delivery. In
pursuit of the federal monies to which low-income students have access,
FPIs capitalize on information asymmetries and valuation problems in the
education sector, resulting in market failure and predatory education.

and Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A1 (“Vets are really not at college to
get the traditional undergraduate experience . . . . We are already professionals.
College is a box checker, meaning we need a college degree to go into whatever
we want to go into.”).
54. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 81.
55. In expressing its opposition to new proposed federal rules to increase
regulation of FPIs, the Career College Association concluded that the rules would
impact 68,000 African-American students, and 79,000 Hispanic students annually.
See Charles Dervarics, Proposal Takes Aim at For-Profit Schools, DIVERSE:
ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., June 6, 2010, at 11; Gonzalez, supra note 17 (noting that
for-profit college officials argue that their nontraditional students are older and
often low-to-middle-income).
56. Between 2005 and 2015, most of the increase in the traditional collegeeligible population will come from students of color, and students from lowincome backgrounds. See Derek V. Price & Jill K. Wohlford, Equity in
Educational Attainment, Racial Ethnic, and Gender Inequality in the 50 States, in
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE: COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY,
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 59, 61 (Gary Orfield et al., eds., 2005) [hereinafter HIGHER
EDUCATION].
57. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE EDUCATION OF BLACK PEOPLE: TEN CRITIQUES,
1906–1960, at 112 (Herbert Aptherer ed., 2001).
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A.The Public Failure
Higher education is a public good that benefits both individuals and
society by promoting democracy and societal wealth. The shift in
conceptualization of higher education from public to private good,
however, occurs against the backdrop of a larger trend to merge public and
private interests for the common good.
i. Merging Public and Private—A Trend
Mergers of private interest and public good are not anything new in
American society, and have ranged in form from professional societies that
regulate and restrict the activities of their members 58 to the contracts with
private entities into which governments enter to provide public services.59
When private interests and profit-making are employed to advance the
public good, there are sometimes casualties in the scramble to make a buck.
Labeled “predatory” in the market context, legal scholarship is rife with
documentation and analysis of business patterns and practices that unfairly
exploit the vulnerabilities of disadvantaged participants in private markets
in order to maximize profit margins. As such, debate continues as to the
extent of influence and involvement that private interests should have in
providing what are commonly understood to be public goods such as
housing, healthcare, or education.60
Two examples highlight some of the typical problems in this context.
Social impact bonds and social benefit organizations are recent attempts to
galvanize the incentivizing force of self-interested pursuit for the public
good. 61 In the social impact bond model, government can contract with a
private-sector financing intermediary for the provision of social services.62
58. See Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust Liability for Collective Speech: Medical
Society Practice Standards, 27 IND. L. REV. 51 (1993) (discussing the intersection
between antitrust law and conflicts of interest among medical societies).
59. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367 (2003) (cataloging examples of privatization of government programs,
including Medicare and Medicaid managed care, welfare, education, and prisons).
See, for example, Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for
the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (2000); for discussion of other
treatments.
60. See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning
of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 153–157 (2010) (discussing advantages
and disadvantages of privatization of government functions).
61. See JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SOCIAL IMPACT
BONDS: A PROMISING NEW FINANCIAL MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL
INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/social_impact_bonds.pdf.
62. Id.
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Because the government will pay the intermediary at a future date only if it
achieves certain performance targets, the intermediary obtains operating
funds by issuing bonds to private investors who provide upfront capital in
exchange for a share of the government payments that will be available
should the intermediary meet the targets.63
Touted as incorporating
“performance-based payments and market discipline,” the social impact
bond model, according to the Center for American Progress, can address
current problems with government funding of social services, which
include insufficient focus on outcomes and evaluation, delayed expansion
of successful social programs, and risk-averse public officials unwilling to
back promising new programs. 64
Beneficial corporations (B-Corps.) and low-profit limited liability
companies (L3Cs) are the latest attempt to blur the line between nonprofit
and for-profit enterprises, combining the financial flexibility of a corporate
entity with the social advantages of a nonprofit entity. 65 Under the BCorp. model, social, environmental, or community goals are embedded into
the company’s governing structure, such that boards of directors and
officers are charged with adhering to those goals while also creating
economic value for shareholders. 66
Similarly, L3Cs are for-profit
organizations designed to retain the corporate advantages of limited
liability corporations (including membership and financing flexibility)
while maintaining a primary charitable purpose and abstaining from
lobbying or political activity. 67
Early signs of trouble, however, have already surfaced. Some scholars
note that the goals of the hybrid forms—expanding the financing available
to blended enterprises while also offering credible commitments to enforce
the enterprises’ blended missions—are often in conflict, with the two goals
“trad[ing] off against each other.”68 Other concerns have been raised
regarding the difficulty of determining whether and when an L3C’s social
purpose has been subordinated to a profit motive. 69
Moreover, normative questions remain about explicit mergers of private
and public interests. Social entrepreneurs list mission, and not profits, as a
primary motive in choosing the L3C business form, 70 and yet a move from
the public sphere to the private is “not simply a neutral phenomenon; it

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early
Observations and Questions to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2010).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Dana Brackman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 654 (2010).
69. Id.
70. See Schmidt, supra note 65, at 176.
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carries inherent political and ideological implications” that can clash with
more selfless missions. 71 Privatization, particularly as it refers to
government transfer of public responsibilities to private hands, symbolizes
a “withdrawal from civic life and reorientation towards the pursuit of selfinterest” and also signals that a particular area of activity is “not an
appropriate subject for public regulation or collective responsibility.” 72
Abdication of the values of “altruism, philanthropy and government
responsibility for the common good” subjects the public good to whims of
private market forces. 73 History has repeatedly shown, however, that the
urgency of a bottom line will often subordinate the needs of the public to
the interests of the private shareholders whose profit motive has, after all,
been honored in these hybrid schemes.74
ii. The Public Good of Higher Education
Like other public goods, higher education has been shaped by market
concepts and private transactions. NPIs have engaged with increasing
frequency in commercial ventures and for-profit activities, resulting in
debate about the point at which this type of activity compromises NPIs’
tax-exempt status. The subject of this paper, however, is not educational
institutions that operate for-profit arms or engage in for-profit activity not
directly related to their educational mission. Rather, this paper focuses
explicitly on FPIs—those colleges and universities guided by a for-profit
motive when delivering higher education. 75 And, with the rise of FPIs has
come the classic problems of the marginalized in the market. Ironically,
the Center for American Progress has identified financial aid for students
attending for-profit post-secondary institutions as an urgent problem that
social impact bonds could be used to address.76
71. Metzger, supra note 59, at 1377.
72. Id. at 1377–78.
73. Mark Rosenman, Commercializing the Public Good, HUFFINGTON POST,
June 8, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-rosenman/commericalizingthe-publi_b_869265.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
74. See id.
75. The same trend can be observed in K–12 public education, as public
charter schools are increasingly permitted to operate on a for-profit basis, and
educational management organizations are given control of public schools, with
the incentive of profits as motivation to improve the schools. As with higher
education, the for-profit motive has led to self-dealing, abuse of public resources,
and concerns regarding the propriety of the for-profit motive in K–12 public
education. See Stephanie Strom, For Charter School Company, Issues of Money
and Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1; Nicholas Confessore & Jennifer
Medina, More Scrutiny for Charter Schools in Debate Over Expansion, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A20. See also Metzger, supra note 59, at 1389–92
(discussing the trend of privatization in public education).
76. See Liebman, supra note 61, at 27.
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The shift in conceptualizing higher education from public good to
private commodity is relatively recent. From the establishment of the first
colonies 77 through the twentieth century, 78 American historical, cultural,
and political understandings have framed higher education as a public
good. The Continental Congress expressed a commitment to national
education, reflected in their disposition of the Northwest Territories. Both
the Land Ordinance of 1785 79 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
provided that portions of the land grants be reserved for public education.80
Records from the Federal Convention of 1787 indicate that at least two
delegates—James Madison and Charles Pinckney—proposed that the
federal government be given specific powers to establish a University, 81
and endorsement for higher education also appeared at the state level, with
states like Georgia, North Carolina, and Vermont making provisions for
universities in their state constitutions.82
The preserved writings of the Founding Fathers further reflect an
understanding of higher education as a public good. Lamenting the dearth
of higher education opportunities in Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin
emphasized the extent to which “[a]lmost all Governments have . . . made
77. New England colonists placed higher education next to godliness: “After
God had carried us safe to New England, and wee [sic] had builded [sic] our
houses, provided necessaries for our liveli-hood [sic], rear’d [sic] convenient
places for Gods [sic] worship, . . . the next things we longed for, and looked after
was to advance Learning . . . .” New England’s First Fruits (1643), reprinted in
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 420, 432 (1935).
78. See Robert M. Berdahl, Policies of Opportunity: Fairness and Affirmative
Action in the Twenty-First Century, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 115, 117 (2000)
(noting that the 1960s, in particular, was a period of high public investment in the
public good of higher education, particularly because of a societal belief that
higher education was integral to creating equal opportunity).
79. The Land Ordinance of 1785 authorized the sale of public lands in the
Northwest that became Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See
JUDITH AREEN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 38 n.1
(2009).
80. “‘[T]here shall be reserved the lot N 16, of every township, for the
maintenance of public schools, within said township,’ and ‘the Federal
Government has included grants of designated sections of the public lands for
school purposes in the Enabling Act of each of the States admitted into the Union
since 1802.’” James F. Shekleton, Strangers at the Gate: Academic Autonomy,
Civil Rights, Civil Liberties, and Unfinished Tasks, 36 J.C. & U.L. 875, 936 (2010)
(quoting The General Land Ordinance of 1785, 28 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 375 (1904–37)). See also AREEN, supra note 79 (citing
GEORGE N. RAINSFORD, CONGRESS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 38 (1972)).
81. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 321, 616
(Max Farrand ed., 1937).
82. See AREEN, supra note 79, at 40 nn. 2–3.
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it a principal Object of their Attention, to establish and endow with proper
Revenues, such Seminaries of Learning, as might supply the succeeding
Age with Men qualified to serve the Public with Honor to themselves, and
to their country.” 83 Similarly, Benjamin Rush, a signatory to the
Declaration of Independence, supported the establishment of a “federal
university under the patronage of Congress” 84 where students could master
“every thing [sic] connected with government,” lest citizens be unprepared
to maintain a republican government. 85
Like Rush, the first six presidents of the United States specifically
advocated establishing a national university. 86 George Washington
appealed to Congress to establish such an institution, citing the need to
assimilate youths in the “principles, opinions, and manners of our
countrymen,” so that the union could be made more permanent, and the
liberties of the country better guarded. 87 Although a national university
was never established, Congress has repeatedly pledged financial support
to public universities. The Morrill Act of 1862 allowed for the
establishment of “land grant colleges” by subsidizing state college and
university creation. 88
The Founders understood, then, that higher education is necessary to
prepare students to be good citizens, capable of thoughtful and responsible
participation in a strong representative democracy. 89
Washington,
Jefferson, and other Founders “regarded public colleges and universities as
an extra-constitutional mechanism to preserve the republic by broadening
the diffusion of learning across social classes and enlarging the population
of persons possessing the skills required for democratic governance and

83. See id. at 29 (quoting Benjamin Franklin, Proposals Relating to the
Education of Young in Pennsylvania (1749)).
84. See DAVID MADSEN, THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, ENDURING DREAM OF
THE USA 16 (1966) (quoting LETTERS OF BENJAMIN RUSH (L. H. Butterfield ed.,
1951)).
85. See AREEN, supra note 79, at 32 (quoting Benjamin Rush, Address to the
People of the United States, AM. MUSEUM, Jan. 1787, at 8).
86. See id. at 36 n.3.
87. See id. at 34 (quoting George Washington, Message to Congress,
December 7, 1796, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: SPEECHES AND MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS 31 (1833)).
88. 7 U.S.C. § 304 (2006) provides for the:
[E]ndowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college
where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and
classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of
learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such
manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in
order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial
classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.
89. RUCH, supra note 7, at 159 (citing the beliefs of philosopher John Dewey).
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useful in diversifying the economy.” 90 Particularly aware of the rigid class
system that limited social mobility in Europe and concentrated wealth
among the elite, the Founders expected higher education to not only bring
“into action that mass of talents which lies buried in poverty,” 91 but also
prevent concentration of powerful new aristocracies in the New World.92
Despite the best of original intentions, both class and race limited access
to higher education. This did not, however, stop minority communities
from conceptualizing education as a precursor to citizenship and
participation in a free democracy. Even before the Civil War, free Blacks
pursued higher education, supported by family wealth or abolitionist
groups, 93 and were welcomed by liberal colleges and universities with a
commitment to individual opportunity, if not racial equality. 94 Two
historically black private colleges and universities, Lincoln University and
Wilberforce University, were also established prior to the war. 95 Black
monthly periodicals published in the first half of the twentieth century
consistently publicized and celebrated African-American college and
university attendance and the historically black colleges and universities
that had been created for this purpose. 96 Led by intellectuals like W.E.B.
Du Bois, higher education was, for middle-class blacks in particular, the
currency of the realm: the opportunity to “place [them]selves in the proper
light before the world” and display capabilities that would challenge white
beliefs in Black inferiority. 97
90. Shekleton, supra note 80, at 934–35.
91. Id. at 935 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to José Correia da Serra
(Nov. 25, 1817)).
92. Thomas Jefferson advocated for a national university to avoid sending
American students to Europe for higher education, for fear that they would return
with a taste for aristocracy and monarchy, and an “abhorrence” for the “lovely
equality which the poor enjoys with the rich in his own country.” See AREEN,
supra note 79, at 35 n.2 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Banister,
Jr. (1785), reprinted in HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE COMMONWEALTH OF
LEARNING 63–64 (1968)).
93. See Ellen N. Lawson & Marlene Merrill, The Antebellum “Talented
Thousandth”: Black College Students at Oberlin Before the Civil War, 52 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 142 (1983) (chronicling the story of the one hundred African
American men and women who studied at Oberlin College before the Civil War).
94. See James Oliver Horton, Black Education at Oberlin College: A
Controversial Commitment, 54 J. NEGRO EDUC. 477, 481 (1985) (tracing Oberlin
College’s commitment to black education, from its founding until 1980).
95. Roy L. Brooks, American Democracy and Higher Education for Black
Americans: The Lingering-Effects Theory, 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 24
(2005).
96. See Michael Fultz, “The Morning Cometh”: African-American
Periodicals, Education, and the Black Middle Class, 1900-1930, 80 J. NEGRO
HIST. 97, 105 (1995).
97. Id.
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Major changes in the higher education landscape ultimately helped the
United States realize its vision of broader access to higher education. The
land-grant movement that began in the mid-nineteenth century established
state colleges and universities for the purpose of educating those who could
benefit from advanced education but were uninterested in the traditional
divinity training provided by colleges like Harvard and Yale. 98 During the
1950s and 60s, legal and social movements increased access to higher
education, and as access expanded, the democratic principle of “educat[ing]
people who would then better serve society as workers, citizens, and
leaders” was reinforced. 99 Landmark education legislation in the twentieth
century, including the G.I. Bill, which subsidized higher education for
veterans; the National Defense of Education Act of 1958, which provided
federal funds for student loan programs; and the Pell Grant program, which
established financial assistance for low-income students, reflected an
enduring American belief in the ability of higher education to function as a
“great equalizer.” 100
Indeed, for students who do obtain quality higher education, the
experience pays dividends. Higher education confers both economic and
social benefits, preparing students for a vocation and enabling them to
economically support themselves in the world.101 Higher education has
become increasingly necessary for occupational and economic success in
the United States. While jobs that require on-the-job training are expected
to see the greatest decline in numbers, ninety percent of jobs in the new
fast-growing information and service economy will require some
postsecondary education. 102 According to the Department of Labor, there
will be close to four million new job openings in education, health care,
and computer and mathematical sciences by the year 2014. 103
Higher education is associated with lower rates of unemployment and
higher income for all ethnic groups. 104 As a segue to gainful employment,
98. See HOWARD R. D. GORDON, THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF VOCATIONAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA 39–53 (2d ed. 2003).
99. See Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 127
(2003).
100. See MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE
STUDENT AID GAME 11 (1998).
101. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 158.
102. TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra note 50, at 7.
103. Id.
104. See SUSAN AUD, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
GROUPS 144–46 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010015.pdf;
KATHRYN HOFFMAN, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS 116 (2003),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003034.pdf.
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higher education is either a signaling game or a screening game. As the
former, postsecondary education does not necessarily teach useful job
skills. Rather, the main function of postsecondary education is to signal to
employers that particular students are ambitious, hard working, responsive
to training, and “conformist.” 105 As a screening game, formal education is
a mechanism that employers can use to identify “fast learners” who can be
trained quickly at lower cost. 106
Individuals with higher education earn more than their high school
graduate counterparts. Even after controlling for social class, test scores,
marital status, labor force experience, and location, those holding
bachelor’s degrees earn thirty to fifty percent more per year than those
holding only high school diplomas; those holding associate’s degrees earn
twenty to thirty percent more. An individual holding a bachelor’s degree
will earn $2.1 million over his or her lifetime, nearly twice as much as an
individual with only a high school diploma. 107
Degrees obtained through higher education also objectify cultural and
social capital, conveying “officially recognized” competence and
facilitating the establishment of a monetary value for which that
competence can be exchanged on the labor market.108 By signaling an
affiliation with a particular institution, education can provide social capital,
giving its possessors access to a network of “institutionalized relationships
of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” 109 These networks can be
mobilized to help graduates navigate any number of life’s challenges, from
finding a job to securing elite educational opportunities for one’s children.
Moreover, it integrates marginalized citizens, creating the stronger union
necessary for national security.
Higher education also cultivates the educated citizenry necessary to
maintain an enduring and vibrant democracy. There is a positive
correlation between higher education and propensity to vote. 110 Even after
controlling for social background and personality traits, college- and
university-educated people have a greater interest in politics and political
105. See Alison Wolf et al., Are Too Many Students Going to College?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 2009, at B7; Creola Johnson, Credentialism and
the Proliferation of Fake Degrees: The Employer Pretends to Need a Degree; The
Employee Pretends to Have One, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 296–97
(2006).
106. See Johnson, supra note 105, at 297.
107. TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra note 50, at 7.
108. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION: A
CRITICAL READER 83, 88 (Alan R. Sadovnik ed., 2007). To the extent that the
cultural and social capital of education can be used to obtain financial benefit, both
can also be considered economic capital. Id. at 89.
109. Id. at 88.
110. Voting rates among whites and Blacks generally increase with higher
levels of educational attainment. HOFFMAN, ET AL., supra note 104, at 124.
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activism, and show higher levels of humanitarianism and social
conscience. 111 Public social benefits include civic engagement, increased
charitable giving, lower public health costs, the production of a diverse
cohort of leaders, and even the preservation of cultural heritage.112
Finally, education confers broad economic advantages. The benefits to
taxpayers—even those without children in the public education system—
include higher tax revenue for social support and insurance programs, 113
reductions in spending on such programs, and savings on the costs of
incarceration, even given the increased costs of providing for increased
educational attainment.114 Unemployment rates are generally lower for
people with higher levels of educational attainment than for those with
lower levels. 115 A more educated citizenry also maintains a country’s
global standing, particularly as countries compete to retain high-value jobs
and highly educated labor forces. 116
Despite disagreement as to the definition of the phrase “public good,”117
given its importance to national interests and personal, social and economic
111. See David Karen & Kevin J. Dougherty, Necessary but Not Sufficient:
Higher Education as a Strategy of Social Mobility, in HIGHER EDUCATION, supra
note 56, at 33.
112. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 37.
113. Even after subtracting the public revenue that has financed a degree, on
average across countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD), a male with a tertiary level of education will
generate an additional $86,000 in income taxes and social contributions compared
to a male who has only completed a secondary level of education. See ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2010, 13 (2010)
[hereinafter OECD].
114. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL & EMRE ERKUT, THE BENEFITS TO TAXPAYERS
FROM INCREASES IN STUDENT EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT xiv–xx (2009). By
“increased educational attainment,” the authors mean more time in school, rather
than a “better education.” Id. The authors also did not account for the cost of
developing programs designed to encourage increased educational attainment.
115. See THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., DIGEST EDUC. STATISTICS 2009, at 553 (April
2010).
116. See OECD, supra note 113, at 13.
117.
Even the phrase “the public good” shares space in our
discourse with ‘the common good’ and “the public interest.” There
are also many references to a different concept, “public goods,” in
concert with the ascendance of market models and economic
approaches to public life . . . . [Scholars argue that] the idea of the
public good is a fundamentally unsettled, contested concept, . . .
[and] that the public good is a dynamic and indeterminate social and
cultural construct.
See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 25–26 (quoting Brian
Pusser, Higher Education, the Emerging Market, and the Public Good, in THE
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development, education is commonly understood to be a public good,
likened by some scholars to healthcare as a prerequisite for a wellfunctioning democracy and for a good life.118 Moreover, the two
commonly identified characteristics of a public good—nonrivalry119 and
nonexcludability120—can both be attributed to education.
In accordance with objections to the commodification of public
goods, 121 education in the United States is distributed to all students for
“free” in the primary and secondary public school system. 122 Despite
having declined to declare education a “fundamental right,” even the
federal judiciary has affirmed the “supreme importance” of education,
characterizing education as a “most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government,” which provides the
“basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives
to the benefit of us all.” 123
B.PredEd
By forsaking research or service missions, failing to promote civic
engagement, and yielding poor social and economic outcomes for
graduates of the institutions relative to their peers at NPIs, FPIs do not
further the public good of higher education. In addition, the for-profit

KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND POST SECONDARY EDUCATION: REPORT OF A
WORKSHOP 105, 118 (Patricia Albjerg Graham & Nevzer Stacey eds., 2002)).
118. See, e.g., AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? 137 (2004) (“The three principles that provide the content of
deliberative democracy—basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity—
also flow from the basic principle of reciprocity . . . . Those basic opportunities
typically include adequate health care, education, security, work, and income.”).
119. One person’s enjoyment of the good of education does not interfere with
the ability of others to enjoy it at the same time. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at
848.
120. Once education has been provided to one person, there is no way to
prevent society in general from benefitting from the increased social and economic
output cultivated as a result of the education. See id.
121. “The commodification objection states that certain basic public goods
like education, environmental quality, sanitation, housing, and policing should be
provided on a relatively equal basis regardless of individuals' private resources.”
Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1835
(2003).
122. Although American public schools do not charge admission or tuition
fees, they are not actually free. Rather, public schools are funded through local
property taxes, through which all taxpayers fund education, whether or not they
have children in the public school system. See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation-Prompted School
Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 765 (1995).
123. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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motive incentivizes providers to exploit the indeterminate nature of the
good, resulting in market failure—net harm to students, rent-seeking
behavior, fraud, deception, and the absence of legal remedies, all at the
expense of the public and the underserved student population for-profits
purport to help.
i. For-Profits and the Public Good
Ideals regarding the necessity of higher education for the public good
are reflected in higher education legislation enshrining the different
motives of FPIs and NPIs, and serve as a guide for congressional and
executive spending. Section 101 of the Higher Education Act (HEA)
explicitly acknowledges the differing priorities of FPIs and NPIs by
preserving a dual definition of “post-secondary institutions” —NPIs are
defined as “assets irrevocably dedicated to the public trust.”124 The dual
definition serves to make FPIs ineligible for federal funding provided to
support institutions, as opposed to individual students. As such, although
FPIs can enroll students with access to Title IV student loans, they are
prohibited from receiving funds from Titles III and V of the HEA. 125
In terms of spending, the Obama administration has proposed billions of
dollars in aid to the nation’s community colleges to enable the institutions
to produce five million more graduates by the year 2020. 126 In response to
queries about the exclusion of FPIs from the aid programs, Robert M.
Shireman, the U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Education responded that
“Institutional aid doesn’t make sense for the for-profit side of things, but it
does make sense for the community-college side of things, where the
owners are the public.” 127
Shireman’s response is fitting. In the absence of a free postsecondary
education system, NPIs have been committed to pursuing the public-good
goals of education. In contrast, although heavily supported by federal
funding, FPIs explicitly eschew a commitment to the public good, while

124. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6 at 162; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et
seq. (2008).
125. Title III programs support institutions that enroll large numbers of lowincome students, while Title V programs support institutions with enrollment that
is at least twenty-five percent Hispanic. For purposes of access to the Title IV
student loan program, however, the HEA embodies a single definition of “postsecondary institution.” Id. at 162–63.
126. See President Barack Obama, Remarks in Warren, Mich. (July 14, 2009)
(excerpts available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Excerpts-ofthe-Presidents-remarks-in-Warren-Michigan-and-fact-sheet-on-the-AmericanGraduation-Initiative/).
127. See Jennifer Gonzalez, For-Profit Colleges, Growing Fast, Say They Are
Key to Obama’s Degree Goals, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 8, 2009, at A17
(quoting Robert M. Shireman, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Education).
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guided in large part, if not exclusively, by an obligation to maximize
private wealth for their shareholders and investors. Public tax dollars prop
up the industry through the provision of federally funded student loans and
grants; indeed, publicly traded FPIs derive seventy-five percent of their
revenue from federal funds in the form of federal financial student aid.128
Despite this dependence on public money, FPIs lack even their own
libraries, cutting costs by depending on student use of public libraries and
publicly subsidized NPI libraries. 129 As admitted by a for-profit dean,
doing social good is “not the primary objective of for-profit universities . . .
. For-profit universities do not have as their primary mission the shaping of
a more informed citizenry, or creating a more cultured population, or
helping young people understand their heritage, their society, and its
values.” 130
FPIs also lack research or service missions. Unlike NPIs that “offer not
only classes, but also free arts, cultural, recreational, social-service,
business, and extension programs,” 131 FPIs exist solely to provide classes
to students—at a profit. Inculcating a sense of community or civics is not
always cost efficient, and yet NPIs are motivated by their service missions
to pursue initiatives that do just that. In contrast, FPIs are motivated by
their profit missions to eschew those same initiatives. Tenure, for example,
is costly for NPIs, but helps ensure that instructors can push students to
think critically about even their own schools without fear of reprisal.
Tenure, however, is notably absent for faculty members at FPIs. 132
Moreover, some nonprofit community colleges offer their students support
beyond remedial academic offerings, including access to physical and
mental health professionals, food banks, and day care facilities—services
that affect the bottom line and are notably absent at FPIs. 133 Although the
public good of education is understood to promote democracy by including
civic engagement and development of citizenship, research suggests that
128. See Golden, supra note 1.
129. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND
THE NEW ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND THE NEW ECONOMY 4 (2004).
130. See RUCH, supra note 7, at 72–73.
131. TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 165 (citing Donald Heller).
132. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 40. The experiences of
faculty at FPIs also present many problems, ranging from encouragement to falsify
student grades and dumb-down curriculum, to harassment for objecting to
unethical business practices. In response to an op-ed, the author has been
contacted directly by a for-profit faculty member to discuss the absence of
academic autonomy and freedom, the hiring of unqualified faculty, and the
obligation of faculty to do anything to “keep bodies in the seats.” See also The
Fear and Frustration of Faculty at For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
July 15, 2011, at B12 [hereinafter Fear and Frustration].
133. See, e.g., Josh Keller, For the Jobless, Community College Offers a
Safety Net, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 11, 2011, at A23.
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students in the for-profit sector are less likely than students at nonprofit
community colleges to vote, participate in political activities, or become
involved in their communities.134
Although a better-educated citizenry produces societal wealth in the
forms of higher standards of living, 135 greater levels of productivity, higher
rates of consumer spending, increased tax revenues, and decreased public
expenditures for social services, 136 research suggests that for-profit students
do not fare as well economically as their nonprofit public and private
counterparts. 137 Studies from the 1970s and 1980s conclude that FPIs
provided weaker economic returns to graduates than public sector
institutions, a proposition that has also been supported by more recent
studies. 138 Payscale, an online provider of employee compensation data,
reported in 2010 that graduates of for-profit Kaplan University, for
example, earn less income than the national average. 139 Mounting evidence
suggests that poor returns are, in part, a result of subpar academic training
delivered at the schools. 140
ii. Market Failure and Predatory Education
In addition to failing to serve the public good despite relying so heavily
on public funds, FPIs have capitalized on the indeterminate nature of the
good of education and the lack of adequate legal remedies. This creates
market failure 141 in the form of fraudulent, abusive, and questionable
business practices.
More severe than simply allocating education
inefficiently or disadvantaging investors, unethical behavior in pursuit of
profit affects the livelihood of the students who attend the institutions.
Low-income, first-generation, and minority students are aggressively
and unethically recruited by FPIs, sometimes with unsubstantiated
promises of high post-graduation salaries and no obligation to repay
134. See KEVIN KINSER, FROM MAIN STREET TO WALL STREET: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 77 (2006).
135. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 154–55.
136. See EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 36–37.
137. See KINSER, supra note 134, at 74.
138. Id.
139. See Daniel Golden, Online Colleges Target Veterans: GI Benefit-rich
Veterans Help Kaplan and Other Universities Avoid Federal Financial Aid Rules,
BUS. WK., Nov. 8, 2010, at 26.
140. The obligation of faculty at the schools to “dumb-down” curriculum,
falsify student grades, and tolerate inadequate academic progress has been
repeatedly documented. See Fear and Frustration, supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
141. “Market failure” means a failure of market mechanisms to correct for
flaws like information asymmetry or unequally distributed power, thus diminishing
or eliminating the likelihood that the market will produce optimal outcomes for all
participants.
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student loans. The inability of students to find gainful employment upon
graduation is partially to blame for the disproportionate share of for-profit
students who ultimately default on federal student loans. Ironically, it is
this student population that stands to gain the most from higher education,
and conversely loses the most when its education at FPIs is fraudulently
rendered.
The word “predatory” is a term of art, the meaning of which has been
contested 142 but nevertheless applied to business practices across various
industries. 143 At its simplest, the definition of a predatory educator might
be one who, in pursuit of profit, takes advantage of students by unfair,
although not necessarily unlawful, means. Comparing the practices of
many for-profit educators to the practices of predatory lenders, a similar
pattern of behavior emerges between the two. These practices include: (1)
providing an educational experience that results in net harm to students; (2)
harmful rent-seeking behavior; (3) securing student enrollment through
fraud or deception; (4) securing student enrollment through
misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and questionable business practices that
do not amount to outright fraud; and (5) capitalizing on the absence of legal
remedies. 144
1. Net Harm to Students: Student Loan Default
As already discussed, FPIs lack service missions, eschewing those
initiatives that inculcate a sense of community or civics among students but
fail to maximize profit. As a result, students in the for-profit sector are less
142. The absence of a clear definition of predatory lending has served as an
impediment to the creation of new remedies and increased federal regulation. See
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259–60 (2002).
143. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) (describing predatory
pricing as an antitrust offense through which firms drive out or exclude rivals by
selling at an unremunerative price); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd
Business or Predatory Lending, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002) (labeling the business
practices of certain payday lenders as predatory because they reap generous profits
by taking advantage of consumers through unlawful and grossly unfair means);
Engel & McCoy, supra note 142, at 1255 (identifying several factors that
characterize predatory lending in the housing market).
144. Engel & McCoy define predatory lending as:
[A] syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that involve one or
more of the following five problems: (1) loans structured to result in
seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, (2) harmful rent
seeking, (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, (4) other
forms of lack of transparency that are not actionable as fraud, and (5)
loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.
Supra note 142, at 1260–61.
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likely than nonprofit students to vote or become involved in their
communities. 145 For-profit graduates also see weaker economic returns on
their education. 146
Concerns regarding the low public and private returns on investment to
for-profit graduates are compounded by the graduates’ disproportionately
high rates of student loan default. 147 To cover the cost of attendance, forprofit students borrow at significantly higher rates than their public and
private nonprofit counterparts.148 In the most recent year for which
national data was available, almost one hundred percent of graduates from
four-year, for-profit colleges and universities took out student loans and
borrowed forty-five percent more than graduates from other types of four
year institutions. 149 For bachelor’s degrees, the median debt for for-profit
students upon graduation is $31,190, compared to $7,960 and $17,040 at
public and private NPIs, respectively. 150
Although accounting for less than ten percent of all college and
university students, for-profit students account for forty-four percent of
student loan defaults. 151 Broken down, the average short-term default rate
of borrowers who attend FPIs is 11.9%, 152 compared to 6.2% of borrowers
from public NPIs and 4.1% of borrowers who attend private NPIs. 153
Worse, when the long-term default rate is analyzed by loans, 154 instead of
by borrower, the data reveals that forty percent of loans granted to
145. TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 165.
146. See supra, notes 134–140 and accompanying text.
147. See id.
148. See REBECCA HINZE-PIFER & RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
THE RISE OF COLLEGE STUDENT BORROWING 1 (2010) (“Students who attend forprofit colleges are more likely than other students to borrow and they typically
borrow larger amounts. One quarter (twenty-four percent) of 2008 bachelor’s
degree graduates at for-profit schools borrowed more than $40,000 compared with
five percent of graduates at public institutions and fourteen percent at not-for-profit
schools.”).
149. DIANE CHANG & MATTHEW REED, THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS AND
SUCCESS, STUDENT DEBT AND THE CLASS OF 2009, at 5 (2010). For-profit students
make up about ten percent of the undergraduate population, and forty percent of all
for-profit students take out private loans. See Letter from George A. Scott,
Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, to Congressional Committees, GAO–10–86R, at 3 (Nov. 17,
2009).
150. EDUC. TRUST, supra note 32, at 6.
151. Michael Vasquez, For-Profit Schools Grow—As Do Complaints, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 5, 2010, at A1.
152. “Short-term” is defined as defaulting within the first two years of
repayment.
153. See Gonzalez, supra note 17.
154. “Long-term” is defined as defaulting within the first fifteen years of
repayment.
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borrowers who attend FPIs are in default within the first fifteen years of
repayment. 155
Demographics do not fully explain the differences in
default rate, as research shows that only fifteen percent of the variation in
two-year college default rates between FPIs and NPIs can be explained by
the low-income students that FPIs are more likely to enroll.156 More
generally, GAO reports have concluded that for-profit institutions perform
worse than public and private nonprofit colleges on most measures of
quality, even when student demographics are taken into account.157
The likelihood of default is not unknown to proprietary school officials,
but it nevertheless fails to temper aggressive recruitment. Employees are
trained to obscure the likelihood that graduates of the school will earn too
little to repay their loans. 158 Recruiters also take advantage of dips in the
economy, assuring students that their programs are an “antidote to hard
economic times,” or a “safe way to be sure . . . [of] income.” 159 Such was
the case of Jeffrey West, a twenty-one-year old man who enrolled in
WyoTech, a chain of trade schools owned by Corinthian Colleges. Despite
blanching at a sticker price of $30,000 for a nine-month program in auto
body refinishing and upholstering technology, he ultimately enrolled after
being subjected to aggressive recruiting by WyoTech admissions officers,
which included meetings at his home. Fourteen months after completing
the program, Mr. West was still unable to find a job in his field. 160 He
ultimately took a position weatherizing foreclosed homes six to seven days
a week, struggling to make loan payments of $600 a month. 161 Should Mr.
West ultimately default on his loans, the public will pick up the tab; when
borrowers default on student loans, taxpayers pay ninety-seven to one
hundred percent of the losses. 162

155. This percentage is in comparison to thirty percent of community college
students. Fewer community college students, however, borrow, resulting in a
smaller actual number of defaults stemming from community college education.
See Field & Brainard, supra note 40.
156. See id. See also EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 32, at 7 (citing
JONATHAN GURYAN & MATTHEW THOMPSON, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., REPORT
ON GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT 15 (2010)).
157. Kelly Field, Demographics Do Not Explain For-Profit Colleges’
Shortcomings on Student-Success Measures, GAO Says, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Dec. 7, 2011.
158. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 33 (profiling Amanda Wallace, a former
financial aid and admissions officer for ITT Technical Institute in Knoxville
Tennessee, who left her job at ITT for the same reason).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Field & Brainard, supra note 40.
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2. Harmful Rent Seeking
Excessively high tuition rates at FPIs indicate rent-seeking behavior in
the industry. Even after controlling for degree, FPIs are not only more
expensive than most nearby public colleges and universities, but sometimes
also more expensive than nearby private colleges and universities. 163 In the
mortgage industry, higher interest rates and fees charged to less creditworthy borrowers are justified as compensation for the higher risks entailed
when servicing sub-prime loans. In the for-profit education sector,
however, school owners do not have risks for which higher tuition
compensates. Indeed, FPIs make money by virtue of access to the federal
loans that accompany their students, regardless of whether students
graduate and find gainful employment and meaningful community
involvement. Subpar educational experiences at FPIs destroy value by
wasting valuable resources, leaving students and society with little to show
for it.
3. Fraud and Deception
FPIs have long attracted allegations of unethical business practices,
including admitting unqualified students, lying about accreditation, and
inflating graduation and job placement rates. 164 At many FPIs, recruiters
also lie to applicants about the cost of attendance165 or promote federal
student loans by noting, “No one will come after you if you don’t pay.” 166
Other FPIs encourage applicants to falsify financial aid forms. A 2010
investigation by the Government Accountability Office featured a FPI
admissions representative who encouraged an undercover applicant to
claim three dependents when the applicant had none.167 In another
instance, an undercover applicant was encouraged not to report $250,000 in
savings on financial aid forms. 168
Although fraud also occurs among NPIs, FPIs produce fraud in amounts
disproportionate to their share of the market. Former Department of
Education Inspector General John P. Higgins, Jr. testified to a House

163. See supra, notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
164. See Hirsch, supra note 25, at 821. See also Eryn Brown, Can For-Profit
Schools Pass an Ethics Test?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at BU5.
165. See Kelly Field, Undercover Probe Finds Widespread Deception in
Marketing by For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C., Aug. 1, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/article/Undercover-Probe-Finds/123744/ (citing instance in
which a representative reported the annual cost of attendance for only nine months
of classes, even though the program was described as year-round).
166. Undercover Testing, supra note 18, at 12.
167. Id. at 7
168. Id.
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Committee in 2005 that seventy-four percent of higher education fraud
cases in the early 2000s came from FPIs alone. 169
4. Misrepresentation and Questionable Business Practices
Prompted by rampant fraud and abuse in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
Congress rewrote parts of the Higher Education Act in 1992 to curb
problematic business practices among for-profit education institutions.170
The bans on incentive compensation for recruiters, however, were
ultimately relaxed, opening the door to aggressive and questionable
recruitment practices like the targeting of homeless shelters. Since then,
the occurrence of unethical business practices has steadily increased. Brent
Park, a former recruiter with for-profit Ashford University who was fired
for failing to make enrollment quotas, described a “boiler room”
environment where “an army of recruiters” would call leads as many as
twenty times a day. 171 In comments submitted to the Department of
Education in 2010, Park wrote, “We are forced to do anything necessary to
get people to fill out an application.”172
Intense pressure to maintain growth and meet recruiting goals has fueled
the aggressive recruiting practices that include badgering potential
enrollees, regularly admitting students who have not graduated from high
school, improperly referring students lacking a high school diploma to local
unaccredited high schools where they can purchase diplomas, and
misleading students about classes and programs in order to secure
enrollment. 173 Hearings in the summer of 2010, held by the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, featured video clips
pulled from an investigation by the Government Accountability Office in
which undercover government applicants posed as prospective students at
fifteen FPIs. 174 The clips, and the accompanying GAO Report, revealed
deceptive or otherwise questionable recruiting practices at all fifteen
institutions visited, including misinformation regarding accreditation status,
graduation rates, employment and expected salaries, program duration and

169. Samuel G. Freedman, Tucked in Katrina Relief, a Boon for Online
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at B8. See also Hirsch, supra note 25, at
821.
170. Id. at B8.
171.See Kelly Field, Government Scrutinizes Incentive Payments for College
Recruiters, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/
Government-Scrutinizes/123728.
172.Id.
173.See Stephen Burd, Promises and Profits, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan.
13, 2006, at A21.
174.See Kelly Field, Lawmakers Focus Ire on Accreditors for Abuses at ForProfit Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 4, 2010), http://chronicle.com/
article/Lawmakers-Focus-Ire-on/123771.
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cost, and financial aid.175 One video clip captured a recruiter telling a
prospective student that barbers could earn $150,000 to $250,000 per year,
even though the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that ninety percent of
barbers make less than $43,000 per year. 176
Another video clip revealed a recruiter denying a student access to a
financial aid officer to discuss his potential debt burden. The recruiter
eventually summoned his supervisor, who badgered the student before
ultimately destroying the student’s application while accusing him of not
being ready to “make the investment of time and money necessary to get
[the student] to where [he] should be at this point.” 177 Aggressive
recruiting is further aided through mass media advertising, as FPIs spend
over one billion dollars per year promoting their programs, 178 often on
television.
The abusive business practices span the industry. In 2004, Apollo
Group, the University of Phoenix’s parent company, paid the federal
government $9.8 million in fines, after a U.S. Department of Education
report detailed compensation and sales tactics that ranged “from illegal to
unethical to aggressive.” 179 According to the report, University of
Phoenix’s corporate culture placed undue pressure on enrollment
counselors to meet or exceed admissions and recruitment targets, often
tying compensation directly to the number of students enrolled, in violation
of federal rules prohibiting such practices.180
In 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated for-profit InterContinental
University because several class-action lawsuits by former employees,
shareholders, and students alleged that recruiters were enrolling themselves
and former students to meet recruiting deadlines, enrolling students who
had not graduated from high school, and conveying an inaccurate level of
admissions selectivity. 181
Similarly, in 2007, Florida Metropolitan
University settled allegations levied by the Florida Attorney General’s
Office that the school had misrepresented the transfer value of its

175.See Undercover Testing, supra note 18, at 6–17; Field, supra note 171.
176. See Undercover Testing, supra note 18, at 10 (video available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XZp-2HDRG0).
177. Id.
178. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Economic Downturn Brings Prosperity and
Opportunities to For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 19, 2008, at
A13.
179. Dawn Gilbertson, Student-Recruitment Tactics at University of Phoenix
Blasted by Feds, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.
azcentral.com/specials /special42/articles/0914apollo14.html.
180. See id.
181. See Burd, supra note 173.
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classes. 182 In 2009, Alta Colleges, Inc. paid the federal government $7
million to settle a lawsuit in which former employees alleged that Alta’s
recruiters lied to prospective students about job-placement rates and
students’ ability to transfer credits to other colleges and universities. 183
Finally, as indication that some FPIs may even consider fines and suits
to be the cost of doing business, Apollo Group was again subject to
accusations of illegal behavior in 2010. Its wholly owned subsidiary,
University of Phoenix, paid $67.5 million in 2010 to both settle a False
Claims lawsuit filed by two former recruiters who alleged that the
institution violated both state and federal bans on incentive compensation,
and to address several shareholder lawsuits, some of which alleged that the
company misled investors about its student recruitment policies.184
5. The Absence of Legal Remedies
To limit legal remedies for students, FPIs sometimes require students to
sign contracts with mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit judicial
remedies and block students from joining class-action suits. 185 In the
education sector, however, such contract clauses are unnecessary given the
futility of using legal remedies to remediate a fraudulently rendered
education.
Similar to the difficulty of assessing the quality of K-12 public
education, 186 higher education defies easy measurement or assessment.
182. See Ron Matus, After a Long Inquiry, State and FMU Settle, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, at 1B. Florida Metropolitan has since been
renamed Everest University.
See FLORIDA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY,
http://fmu.edu (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
183. See Field, supra note 1714.
184. See id; Kelly Field & Jennifer Gonzalez, Education Dept. Will Release
Stricter Rules for For-Profits But Delays a Pivotal One, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.
(D.C., June 15, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Education-Dept-Will-Releas
/65958; Amanda Harmon Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to ForProfit Colleges and Universities: Business Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges,
and Consumer Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505,
518 (2009).
185.See Molly Redden, Supreme Court Decision on Arbitration May Have
Eroded For-Profit Students’ Right to Sue, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 21,
2011.), http://chronicle.com/article/Supreme-Court-Decision-May/127964.
186. K-12 adequacy litigation has illustrated the difficulty of assessing the
quality of education in K-12 public education. More than focusing on equitable
financing among public schools, adequacy litigation focuses on various
educational inputs, including funding, necessary to achieve minimal educational
outcomes. Accordingly, adequacy responds to how much is required to educate
students based on their individual need, which may result in differentiated levels of
financing. In the absence of clear standards by which to evaluate an adequate
education, however, courts have instead tended to focus on equity in inputs. See,
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Education is not singular in consumption, and the extension of benefits
beyond the educated individual impedes singular measurement. Finally,
the quality of education can be assessed neither in advance nor upon initial
inspection. With the exception of skill sets that are easy to certify or test,
education takes a significant amount of time to consume and evaluate for
quality. 187
These obstacles to assessment are only compounded by information
asymmetry. Producers of higher education have more information about
the product than consumers do, including graduates’ employment rates
unmediated by averages and other leveling factors, productivity figures for
faculty, and institutional culture. 188 Recently, the problems asymmetry
poses have been brought into particular relief in the legal education market,
where blame for a supply-and-demand imbalance has been laid at the feet
of law schools that have failed to warn potential students about a shrinking
job market. 189

e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (citing to
curricular and funding inequalities when finding the school system
unconstitutional and discriminatory); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993) (comparing different school districts as support for
the holding that Massachusetts is under constitutional obligation to provide all
public school students with an adequate education). For more detail about the
conflation of equity and adequacy, see also James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing,
and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223 (2008).
187. The process of being educated is often a long-term process, rather than a
singular exchange between student and instructor.
See EARNINGS FROM
LEARNING, supra note 11, at 113.
188. Id.
189. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2011, at BU1; Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2007, at A1. Even as legal demand slacked, applications
increased and more law schools were accredited, prompting the Young Lawyers
Division of the American Bar Association to pass a resolution recommending that
law schools more accurately disclose the employment rates of their graduates. See
A.B.A. Young Lawyers Div. Res. 1YL, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
files/yld_res_1yl.pdf; Molly McDonough, ABA Young Lawyers Want Law Schools
to Provide Better Jobs, Salary Data Up Front, A.B.A.J., Feb. 13, 2011, available
at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_young_lawyers_seek_transparency
_in_law_school_employment_info.
The legal transparency movement has
prompted both scholarship about whether law schools are violating consumer
protection laws, and lawsuits by former students alleging misrepresentations about
employment prospects. See also Joel F. Murray, Professional Dishonesty: Do U.S.
Law Schools That Report False or Misleading Employment Statistics Violate
Consumer Protection Laws? (May 27, 2011) (Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1854709
(arguing
that
although the FTC Act generally applies only to FPIs, the law has been extended to
nonprofit organizations, and that law schools, in reporting false or misleading
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The problem, however, goes beyond just information asymmetry and
also includes evaluation. Just what is a good education? Economists might
conclude that a quality education is measured by its ability to ensure that
the recipient finds gainful employment. 190 Sociologists might look to the
quality and complexity of social networks to which affiliation with an
educational institution provides access for its graduates.191 Certainly, the
allure of the country’s most elite colleges and universities is based, in part,
on perceptions that these institutions provide better employment and social
networking opportunities.
Nevertheless, these measures are
indeterminate.192 Researchers and policymakers disagree about appropriate
indicators of the quality of higher education, 193 and consistent and
meaningful assessment of learning and life outcomes are not likely
forthcoming. 194 Out of thirty possible indicators of educational quality

employment statistics, are engaged in false advertising and deceptive practices);
Complaint, Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson School of Law (2011), (No. 37-201100091898-CU-FR-CTL), 2011 WL 2109327.
190. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
192. Job-placement information is often difficult to obtain, as most academic
arts and sciences departments do not track their graduates, and successful
employment is affected by many factors, of which quality of education is only one.
Moreover, assessing the worth of one’s social network defies precise measurement.
193. The six-year graduation rate, or measure of the proportion of students
who complete their programs within 150% of the normal time allotted, has been
cited as one of the best measures of college performance. See David Glenn, 6-Year
Graduation Rates: a 6-Minute Primer, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/blogs/measuring/6-year-graduation-rates-a-6-minute-primer/
27573. The rate, however, is criticized as incomplete for not only failing to count
students who take a long time to complete their degrees, but also for describing a
minority of students by accounting only for those full-time, first-time students who
enroll in the fall, while ignoring those students who transfer to other institutions
and successfully graduate. The rate also fails to account for student learning or life
outcomes. See Jeffrey Brainard & Andrea Fuller, Graduation Rates Fall at OneThird of 4-Year Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 5, 2010, at A1.
194. The negative consequences of failing to effectively assess higher
education learning include the devaluation of the learning process itself, abrupt and
unpredictable devaluation of the currency of higher education, continued
exploitation of the federal financial-aid system, and limited upward mobility for
institutions not located in “creative class” areas like Greenwich Village or Foggy
Bottom. See Kevin Carey, Student Learning: Measure or Perish, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), Dec. 12, 2010, at A72. Others warn that the standards which
reduce education to single, incomplete measures, like the income-based gainful
employment rule, will soon be applied more broadly to liberal arts departments
across the country, instead of just the FPIs that are currently being targeted with
the rules. See Diane Auer Jones, Gainful-Employment Regulations: Coming Soon
to a Campus Near You, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 7, 2010),
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used by raters of higher education like U.S. News & World Report, Forbes,
and the Academic Ranking of World Universities, fewer than ten are used
by two or more raters, and almost no outcome measures are utilized. 195
Moreover, all measures, whether focused on instructors, quality of courses
taken, or student experience after education is completed, are subject to
limitation. 196
Even assuming that the quality of education could be assessed, avenues
of redress, should a student conclude that her education was poorly or
fraudulently rendered, are few.
Although outright fraud or
misrepresentations are theoretically actionable using suits based in tort and
contract, or under consumer protection regulation, the indeterminate nature
of the good of education makes success through these avenues uncertain.
Using “academic abstention” principles, courts are reluctant to either
subject the professional judgments of educators to judicial review or
impose on educators a duty of care for student outcomes. 197 Academic
abstention also undermines the success of state consumer protection laws
that include scienter and causation requirements subject to the principle.
And even in those cases indicating a pattern of fraud and abuse, judges
have used Supreme Court precedent to deny plaintiffs class-action status,
limiting them to binding arbitration agreements instead. 198
Accordingly, only suits alleging the most egregious instances of fraud
will result in relief for misrepresentation or breach of contract. Even when
legal action is successful, however, legal remedies can neither restore a
student’s lost time nor guarantee transfer credit at another institution.
Limited credit transferability, particularly between FPIs and NPIs,

http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/gainful-employment-regulations-comingsoon-to-a-campus-near-you/29663.
195. See Alex Richards & Ron Coddington, 30 Ways to Rate a College,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 29, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/30-Waysto-Rate-a-College/124160.
196. Degrees attained by instructors, for example, do not necessarily ensure
teaching quality. Similarly, income ten years after graduation is not the sole, or
even the most preferable, assessment of student learning. See David Glenn, Is
Your Psychology 102 Course Any Good?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec 12,
2010, at A14.
197. See Patrick F. Linehan, Note, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to
Policing Proprietary Schools’ Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 763–81
(2001) (describing the limited legal remedies available to victims of fraudulent
practices at FPIs); Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary:” Protecting
Students and Taxpayers Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary Schools’
Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 763–67 (2010).
198. See, e.g., Redden, supra note 185 (discussing how AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion might have an impact on higher education class actions).
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compounds the problem by making it difficult for students to enroll in
alternative institutions without starting again from the beginning. 199
6. Preying on “The Niche”
Some scholars also consider discrimination against protected groups,
even after controlling for risk, to be a feature of predatory business
practices.200 Scholarship has repeatedly documented the propensity of
market economics to disadvantage people of color and other minorities in
the market. 201 Much of this scholarship focuses on discrimination or the
undervaluing of the labor of marginalized groups in the market.
Discrimination in this sense is not the problem in the for-profit education
market; in fact, minorities are aggressively recruited for enrollment in FPIs.
The predatory behavior that does occur at their expense, however, is
particularly distressing given the necessity of education in achieving
economic, political, and social parity for minority groups in America.
Advocacy groups have begun to take notice of the extent to which
students of color are falling victim to fraud and abuse in the for-profit
sector. In May of 2010, “organizations representing students, higher
education, consumers and civil rights” wrote Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan to express concern regarding the high-pressure and deceptive sales
tactics of FPIs. 202 The coalition specifically noted that low-income, first-

199.See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 167–70.
200.See, e.g., Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Defrauding the American Dream:
Predatory Lending in Latino Communities and Reform of California’s Lending
Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (2009) (citing Kathleen C. Engle and Patricia A.
McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007)).
201. “[T]he limitations manifest in neo-classical economists’ analysis
of race, markets, and social outcomes . . . are deeply rooted in two
mainstream theoretical commitments: the market power hypothesis
and an asocial, nonhistorical conceptualization of race and racism.
Much of the discussion . . . has focused on the inability to reconcile
the market power hypothesis with actually observed market
outcomes.”
PATRICK L. MASON & RHONDA WILLIAMS, RACE, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL
OUTCOMES 8 (1997) (summarizing, for example: a study that undermines
economic mismatch theories by emphasizing the role of personal contracts and
informal networks that bar minorities from skilled construction trades; a case study
showing that employment discrimination and occupational segregation block
African American entry into professional/managerial employment; and data
challenging the notion that interracial differences in test scores are a major cause
of interracial differences in wages).
202. Letter from Coalition, Inst. for Coll. Access & Success to Arne Duncan,
Sec’y of Educ. (May 20, 2010), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/
pub/Neg_reg_coalition_support_letter_to_Duncan.pdf.
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generation, and minority students attend FPIs at disproportionately high
rates, “making them particularly vulnerable to illegal or unscrupulous acts”
by proprietary schools. 203 The Education Trust went further, in a nod to the
American economic crisis of 2007–10, labeling the “unfulfilled promise”
of for-profit colleges and universities a “subprime opportunity.” 204
Given the dependence of FPIs on tuition dollars, the availability of Pell
Grants to low-income and minority students makes the students a
particularly attractive demographic for recruitment. From 2003–04, more
than twenty-five percent of Black, Hispanic, and low-income students
began their college careers at FPIs, compared to only ten percent of whites
and seven percent of non-low-income students. 205 In the 2004–05
academic year, although Blacks earned 8.9% of bachelor’s degrees and
11.3% of associate’s degrees, they accounted for fifteen percent of
bachelor’s degrees, and 18.1% of associate’s degrees conferred by FPIs. 206
A similar pattern occurs for Hispanics, who earned 6.3% of bachelor’s
degrees and 10.4% of associate’s degrees, but accounted for 9.6% of
bachelor’s and 14.2% of associate’s degrees earned at FPIs. 207 The
disproportionate rates are only magnified at the nation’s most successful
FPIs. Racial and ethnic minorities made up thirty-nine percent of students
enrolled at the University of Phoenix in 2006, 208 the largest and most
recognizable for-profit university in the country. 209
The vulnerability of lower-income minority students to default on
student loans 210 does little to deter FPIs from aggressively recruiting and
establishing facilities in high-minority urban centers. 211 In their zeal to
make a profit, FPIs make unsubstantiated promises of lucrative and stable
careers to students who have neither the academic preparation nor the
financial support to complete a program. Moreover, recruitment in the forprofit education sector becomes psychologically and emotionally
manipulative, as recruiters exploit educational and financial illiteracy as
203. Id.
204. EDUC. TRUST, supra note 32, at 1.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Charles Pekow, For-Profit Schools Popular Destination for Minorities,
DIVERSE: ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 8, 2007, at 19. While this is
disproportionate, I imagine that “enrollment” numbers would be even more
startling than “graduation” numbers.
207. Id. In 2008, 15.2% of Black, 8.4% of Hispanic and 8.3% of American
Indian students attended FPIs, as compared to only 6.3% of White students. Id.
See AUD, ET AL., supra note 1044, at 127–28.
208. EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 11, at 72.
209. Id. at 71.
210. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 140.
211. See Amy E. Sparrow, Unduly Harsh: The Need to Examine Educational
Value in Student Loan Discharge Cases Involving For-Profit Trade Schools, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 329, 335 (2007).
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well as the unique psychological triggers of marginalized students to close
the deal 212 with students typically hesitant to take on debt for higher
education. 213 FPIs’ television advertisements often feature minority actors
who invoke Black culture through speech and phonetic conventions,
fashion, and description of circumstance to encourage identification and,
ultimately, enrollment among target minority populations. 214 Recruiters are
trained to tell prospective students that a degree would make their parents
proud and make them role models for their children.215 Although pursuit of
higher education can qualify a student to be a role model, as explained in
testimony to the Department of Education, recruiters use such language to
exploit the vulnerabilities of students with trying life circumstances. 216
FPIs ultimately make off with the revenue derived from the federal loans
awarded to these students. Meanwhile, the students, unable to find

212. See infra, notes 268–272 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability
of Minority-Targeted Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851, 872–73 (2010)
(noting that both low-income and minority students are more price sensitive to
tuition costs, with African-Americans, in particular, placing higher value on
student aid and work in order to finance higher education, regardless of economic
background). But see, Rachel E. Dwyer, et al., Youth Debt, Mastery, and SelfEsteem: Class-Stratified Effects of Indebtedness on Self-Concept, 40 SOC. SCI.
RES. 727 (2011) (concluding that young people appear to gain a greater sense of
mastery and self-esteem from carrying educational and credit card debt, and
finding the effect most pronounced among students whose parents hail from the
bottom twenty-five percent in income distribution).
214. See David Crockett, Marketing Blackness: How Advertisers Use Race to
Sell Products, 8 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 245 (2008) (addressing how advertisers
use representations of blackness to deliver promises about product benefits); Osei
Appiah, Effects of Ethnic Identification on Web Browsers’ Attitudes Toward and
Navigational Patterns on Race-Targeted Sites, 31 COMMC’N RES. 312, 313 (2004)
(acknowledging segmented consumer marketing along lines of race, and noting
that “segmenting Blacks based on race is good, but incorporating . . . additional . . .
segmentation . . . may be . . . even better and more effective . . . .”); Creola
Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to
Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165 (2010)
(arguing that targeted advertising to minority communities through the use of
celebrity spokespeople and community leaders should be considered
discrimination).
215. See Field, supra note 171. Reports indicate that veterans were subject to
the same emotional manipulation, with former recruiters from FPIs that targeted
veterans admitting that their recruitment scripts instructed them to ask, “What
about your family? Aren’t you are [sic] doing this for them? You don’t want to let
them down.” Lipton, supra note 53.
216. “We are working the angle of their lifelong hardships and failures to
convince them.” Field, supra note 171 (testimony of Brent Park, a former
recruiter).
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employment sufficient to support their debt, default on their student loan
obligations and incur the harsh consequences that come with student loan
default, including the difficulty of discharging student loans in bankruptcy
proceedings. 217
In response to efforts by the federal government to impose stricter
regulation on the for-profit sector, some advocacy groups have come out
against the proposed regulations, noting that the regulations are likely to
punish the minority and working-class students who disproportionately
attend FPIs. 218 Alma Morales Riojas, president of the Mexican American
National Association, explained, “I’m not a cheerleader for the career
colleges . . . [b]ut if we’re looking to educate our community, we need as
many options as possible.” 219 Responses such as Riojas’ unfortunately
legitimize the rendering of subpar educational experiences to minority
students. Nothing is said of the vocational or certification tracks to which
minority students are often limited at these schools. Meanwhile, their more
advantaged counterparts at NPIs receive liberal arts educations that are
understood to expand long-term career options and cultivate democratic
citizens of the country and the world. 220
Such responses also ignore how a for-profit scheme in higher education
further entrenches societal structures that produce poorly educated students.
To the extent that FPIs are disproportionately dependent on the loan dollars
of students who are not academically prepared for traditional higher
education, legitimizing a for-profit motive in the sector creates an interest

217. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan
Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179 (2009)
(concluding that the “undue hardship” litigation standard in bankruptcy raises
serious concerns regarding access to justice for student-loan debtors); see also
Sparrow, supra note 211 (analyzing the difficulty of qualifying for the “undue
hardship” standard when student loans are at issue).
218. Advocates for minority students are split on whether the rules are
beneficial or problematic. The NAACP and the National Council of La Raza
endorse the proposed gainful employment rules, while the president of the
Mexican American National Association has argued that it would relegate minority
students at career colleges to “second-class status.” See Kelly Field, For-Profits
Spend Heavily to Fend Off New Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. Sept. 10, 2010, at
A1.
219. Id. See also Harry C. Alford, Your Take: Halting Pell Grants at ForProfit Schools Will Hurt Minorities, THE ROOT (Sept. 12, 2010, 11:08 PM),
http://www.theroot.com/views/your-take-halting-pell-grants-profit-schools-willhurt-minorities.
220. Furthermore, FPIs often train students in finite skill sets that can become
obsolete. For a detailed defense of liberal arts education as necessary to maintain
stable democracies, and of education for a “more inclusive type of citizenship,”
rather than just for profit-making, see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT:
WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES 7 (2010).
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group vested in a steady source of undereducated students. Given the
limited K–12 educational opportunities for working class and minority
students that steer these students to FPIs, the perverse incentive created to
maintain those limitations, and the economic instability furthered in poor
and minority communities when for-profit education results in mass loan
default, eliminating predatory behavior in the higher education sector is
both a moral and economic issue.
REGULATION AND REMEDIES
“The struggle is not between market-based reforms and the educational
status quo. It is about whether the democratic ideal of the common good
can survive the onslaught of a market mentality that threatens to turn every
human relationship into a commercial transaction.” 221
For various reasons, the for-profit market will not fix itself. The federal
student loan programs, to which FPIs have access, are currently very
profitable. As exemplified by those FPIs subject to repeated legal
proceedings for illegal and unethical business practices,222 the benefit of
enrolling students through fraud and coercion exceeds the cost of legal
discipline for illegal or unethical business practices. Moreover, regulation
that denies repeat offenders access to the market only addresses those
market participants who are eventually caught, doing very little to address
offenders who fly under the radar indefinitely. Furthermore, competition in
the market is stifled by information asymmetries and the absence of
advertising in the higher education sector. Not only do NPIs commit much
less of their revenue to advertising than FPIs, but providing specific pricepoints for education is difficult given the multiple factors that go into
setting nonprofit tuition, including student’s financial background, the
availability of state and federal financial aid, and the ability of NPIs to
subsidize student tuition using endowment funds.
Accordingly, regulation might be an option for reigning in abuse in the
sector. Regulation and consumer protection law that address fraud and
abuse in the for-profit sector, however, is often under-enforced by state and
federal agencies. Moreover, although laws and regulatory activity can be
better targeted to address industry abuses directly, legal responses to
predatory education will always be hampered by the indeterminate nature
of the good of information, permanent market flaws in the sector, and the
warping effect of the for-profit motive; the problem is in the premises.
Accordingly, policymakers who are serious about ending predatory
behavior in the industry must consider limiting participation in the federal

221. Alex Molnar, Charter Schools: The Smiling Face of Disinvestment, 54
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 9, 15 (1996).
222. See supra notes 179–184 and accompanying text.
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student financial aid program only to those areas least susceptible to fraud
and abuse. Remaining monies should be channeled to NPIs, where the
non-distribution constraint removes incentives for predatory behavior, and
where education opportunities for those students currently recruited by
FPIs can be maximized.
A.The Perils of For-Profit
Given the nature of higher education, fraud, ethical violations, and abuse
can certainly occur at NPIs, but to the extent that they occur at higher rates
in the for-profit industry, are they a result of the for-profit motive? Is the
nonprofit form inherently more appropriate for the rendering of higher
education?
Several theories about the structure of nonprofit and for-profit entities
suggest that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Scholars have
examined the unique role of nonprofit organizations, with much research
focusing on the particular competency of nonprofit organizations in
providing public goods.
Limited by a non-distribution constraint,
nonprofits are prohibited from distributing excess revenue to owners. 223
The very form of the nonprofit also remedies a specific type of market
failure that we have examined in higher education: the inability of
consumers to accurately evaluate the good, which results in contract
failure—the inability to police producers of the good through ordinary
contractual devices. 224 In such cases, consumers benefit by purchasing the
good from nonprofit producers who, although capable of raising prices and
cutting quality without fear of customer reprisal, lack the incentive to do so
because profits cannot ultimately be distributed to managers. 225 Although
nonprofit organizations may nevertheless still be incentivized to distribute
earnings in the form of inflated salaries or special benefits to employees,

223. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 838. But see Evelyn Brody, Agents
Without Principles: The Economic Convergence of the NonProfit and For-Profit
Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1996) (critiquing the
nondistribution theory as circular for its suggestion that nonprofits are created and
maintained to provide those services for which the public cannot judge quality. If
nonprofit status is a sign of trustworthiness, the legal form then “bestows a halo”
on nonprofit organizations without merit, and also fails to help the public choose
between competing nonprofits). See also Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for
Charitable Efficiency: Designing A Nondiversion Constraint, 56 S.M.U. L. REV.
675 (2003) (proposing a legislative model, to operate in conjunction with
Hansmann’s nondistribution constraint, that targets exemption through a
nondiversion constraint based on transfer taxes on diversion transactions within the
organization, thereby justifying tax exemption not just on the basis of an absence
of private benefit, but also on the presence of a public benefit).
224. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 843–44.
225. See id. at 844
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nonprofits offer a second-best, if imperfect, alternative to the for-profit
motive. 226 Scholars have further theorized that market discipline for these
difficult-to-evaluate goods can be so weak that efficiency losses to be
expected from for-profit producers is likely greater than those expected
from nonprofit producers. 227
Contract failure features prominently in the provision of public goods.
Even in those situations where consumers are willing to adequately
contribute to the production of public goods,228 contributors will
nevertheless be wary that managers, motivated by a commitment to making
a profit, are incentivized to solicit payments in excess of what is actually
needed to pay for creation and distribution of the good. Arguably, this is
just what has occurred in the for-profit education sector, exemplified by
tuition for associate’s degrees costing six to thirteen times more at FPIs
than public NPIs and, in some instances, certificate programs costing
almost twenty-seven times more. 229 In the nonprofit context, contributors
would at least have some assurance that such an incentive was absent.230
Notoriously difficult to evaluate and assess,231 higher education is one such
public good; consumers are best served by contracting for education from
entities that lack the incentive to capitalize on those difficulties in the
pursuit of profit.
Abusive business practices in the for-profit higher education sector are
also linked to the lifecycle of FPIs. Access of FPIs to capital markets
allows them to respond quickly to growth spurts in particular fields. 232
Rapid growth becomes problematic, however, as the success of for-profit
enterprises eventually comes to depend on continued escalation of stock
prices. When escalation expectations are not met, the threat of sharp and
significant drops in stock valuation can lead the entities to engage in
fraudulent practices in an effort to maintain share prices.233 Indeed, rapid
226. Id.
227. See id. at 844–45.
228. The nonrivalry and nonexcludability characteristics of public goods
typically result in positive externalities that encourage free-riding. Moreover,
when individual consumers consider the cost of their individual consumption of a
public good, they fail to consider the benefit to society more generally, and thus
undervalue the good. This results in insufficient support for the creation of those
public goods.
229. See Undercover Testing, supra note 18, at 17.
230. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 835, 849–51.
231. See supra notes 1866–196 and accompanying text.
232. See LESTER M. SALAMON, THE RESILIENT SECTOR: THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 68 (2003).
233. Id. at 68–69. Similar trends have been observed in healthcare where,
compared to for-profit providers, nonprofit providers are “slower to react to
change, expanding capacity less quickly when demand rises, and dropping services
or withdrawing from markets less frequently when profitability declines.” Mark
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growth has been cited as the number one “risk factor for abuse” in the forprofit higher education industry, 234 which has both grown at an astounding
pace and been plagued by unethical and illegal student recruiting, outright
fraud, and predatory behavior regarding disadvantaged students.235
Unsurprisingly, the latest wave of fraud and abuse in the industry comes
just as years of “unrestrained” record enrollment growth in the industry are
coming to an end. 236 In contrast, nonprofits are not dependent on rapid and
ever-escalating growth to justify their existence. Accordingly, the
involvement of nonprofit entities in fields like higher education is
important because “the public has a crucial stake in maintaining a durable
level of quality . . . ” 237 in education, particularly during those times when
the economy is unstable.
There are also indications that the for-profit motive undermines the very
quality of education delivered at FPIs. As discussed earlier, assessing the
quality of education can be difficult, although research does suggest that
for-profit education fails to deliver the broader societal goods that higher
education has been understood to provide. For-profit graduates, for
example, have lower levels of civic engagement and enjoy weaker
economic returns on their education. 238 Moreover, student outcomes are
poorer at FPIs. Reports from as early as 1997 have found that FPIs have
poor training-related placement rates that cannot be explained by heavy
reliance of the schools on title IV funds. 239 Furthermore, only twenty-two
percent of first-time, full-time, bachelor’s degree seeking students enrolled
at FPIs earn degrees within six years, compared to fifty-five and sixty-five
percent of students at public and private NPIs, respectfully. 240 Although

Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, How NonProfits Matter in American Medicine,
and What to Do About It, 25 HEALTH AFF. 287, 291 (2006).
234. See Freedman, supra note 169.
235. See supra, notes 173–180, and accompanying text. Similar trends have
been observed in the health care sector, with nonprofit organizations appearing
more trustworthy in delivering services, and being less likely to make misleading
claims, have patients lodge complaints, or treat vulnerable patients differently from
other patients. See Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 233, at 291.
236. See Goldie Blumenstyk, As For-Profit Colleges’ Enrollment Growth
Slows, Analysts See Signs of an Industry Reset, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.,
Nov. 11, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-Colleges-May-Be-at/
125379. See also Tamar Levin, Scrutiny and Suits Take a Toll on For-Profit
College Company, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at A1 (“The growth of the forprofit sector . . . has been nothing short of explosive.”).
237. See SALAMON, supra note 2322, at 69.
238. See supra, notes 134–140 and accompanying text.
239. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-103,
PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: POOR STUDENT OUTCOMES AT SCHOOLS THAT RELY
MORE ON FEDERAL STUDENT AID 3 (2009).
240. See EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 32, at 2–3.
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FPIs defend their rates by explaining that they serve a disproportionately
disadvantaged student population, public and private NPIs with similar
admissions policies or similar percentages of low-income students
nevertheless graduate similar students at higher rates.241 Widespread fraud
and abuse, failure to deliver on public benefits, and poorer student
outcomes make it plausible to conclude that the very quality of education at
FPIs is not comparable to that rendered at NPIs.
Although the purpose of this paper is not to denigrate the private sector,
we must acknowledge that “private organizations may not develop the
institutional norms of professionalism and public service that characterize
many public bureaucracies.” 242 Arguably, this reality is only heightened
when applied explicitly to FPIs in the private sector (as opposed to private
NPIs). NPIs encourage their managers to look inward to identify and
respond not to incentives to create revenue, but to the needs of the public;
the goal is not to make more money, but to provide better service. A
motivation to provide better service, rather than increase profits, is what is
most needed in the higher education sector, particularly for those
marginalized students whose access to quality education has systematically
been subpar. Accordingly, it is fitting that higher education operates
primarily in the nonprofit context.243
This reality is tellingly illustrated by the efforts of NPIs 244 to lower both
student loan default rates and boost minority graduation rates, even though
the efforts to do so can undermine revenue. From early 2000 to 2004, one
consortium of fourteen historically black colleges and universities
committed to quarterly meetings and sharing of best practices, including
the creation of “default management teams,” the re-examination of
financial aid packages, improvement of retention programs, and financial

241. See id., at 3 (comparing data for six-year graduation rates among fouryear institutions). Data suggesting that the completion rates of FPIs are
significantly higher than that of community colleges problematically fails to
control for transfer rates and program length. When corrected, community
colleges and FPIs have completion rates of forty and sixty-one percent
respectively. See CHRISTOPHER M. MULLIN, AM. ASS’N OF CMTY. COLLS., JUST
HOW SIMILAR? COMMUNITY COLLEGES AND THE FOR-PROFT SECTOR 8 (2010).
242. Freeman, supra note 59, at 574.
243.Twenty-two percent of employment in America’s nonprofit sector can be
attributed to private, NPIs. Moreover, NPIs account for forty-six percent of the
higher education sector. SALAMON, supra note 232, at 11. Assuming public
colleges and universities can also be considered nonprofit, both percentages likely
jump past fifty percent.
244. Although the term “nonprofit” generally applies to private nonprofit
entities, to the extent that public institutions are also constrained by a
nondistribution constraint, I use the term “nonprofit” institution to refer to both
public and private nonprofit institutions of higher education.
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literacy programs for students, all in an effort to lower loan default rates. 245
Other NPIs have enjoyed large gains in minority graduation rates by
implementing pipeline programs that improve college-readiness, improving
teaching in remedial and introductory courses, and monitoring student
progress through advising and early warning systems. 246
In contrast, the results of a 1998 survey administered to 1,000 venture
capital firms to ascertain their interest in investing in for-profit education
revealed that “potential return on investment,” as well as “size and growth”
of the for-profit industry were the primary reasons to invest, while
“improving education” was ranked last. 247 Models that compare revenue
sources and spending by NPIs and for-profit entities further underscore a
primary commitment to profit: FPIs rely almost exclusively on tuition for
their operating revenue, while spending less than NPIs on instruction and
support services. 248 Devoted to “student acquisition and retention,” FPIs
spend twenty-three percent of their revenue on recruiting, as compared to
one and two percent respectively, for public and private NPIs. 249 Today, at
least one major FPI spends more on marketing than it does on actual
education. 250
B.The Futility of Regulation
To the extent that structural failures in the for-profit education market
create opportunities for fraud and abuse, legislation and monitoring by
regulatory agencies can all play some role, although the impact of these
responses is ultimately limited. Moreover, the very debate about what form
regulation takes obscures more fundamental issues about for-profit motives
that maximize producer incentives to prey on already marginalized student
populations.

245. See ERIN DILLON & ROBIN V. SMILES, EDUCATION SECTOR, LOWERING
STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT RATES, WHAT ONE CONSORTIUM OF HISTORICALLY
BLACK INSTITUTIONS DID TO SUCCEED 7–11 (2010), available at http://www.
educationsector.org/sites/default/files/publications/Default_Rates_HBCU.pdf.
246. See JENNIFER ENGLE & CHRISTINA THEOKAS, THE EDUC. TRUST, TOP
GAINERS: SOME PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES MAKE BIG
IMPROVEMENTS IN MINORITY GRADUATION RATES (2010), available at
http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/CRO%20Brief%20(
Top%20Gainers).pdf.
247. See Morey, supra note 49, at 142.
248. Goldie Blumenstyk, Why For-Profit Colleges Are Like Health Clubs,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 5, 2006), http://chronicle.com/article/Why-ForProfit-Colleges-Are/19963. The model may not account, however, for factors like
greater efficiency at FPIs.
249. Id.
250. See Vasquez, supra note 151.
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i. Rules, Rules, Rules
In response to high default rates and industry abuses among FPIs in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress made two key changes to the Higher
Education Act that affect eligibility for federal student aid: the 90/10 rule,
and the 50/50 rule. 251 Under the 90/10 rule, a proprietary institution may
derive no more than ninety percent of its revenues from federal grants and
loans; 252 the rule’s rationale is that an institution’s education should be
worthwhile enough that students are willing to spend some of their own
money to finance it. 253 Under the 50/50 rule, proprietary institutions may
offer no more than fifty percent of their courses online or as
correspondence courses. 254 Federal legislation has also set guidelines
restricting the extent to which compensation for recruiters at FPIs can be
tied to student enrollment. 255
More recently, a series of hearings held by the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions during 2010 focused on for-profit
higher education, with committee chairman Senator Tom Harkin vowing to
crack down on “bad actors” in the industry. 256 Just weeks before the start
of the hearings, the Department of Education proposed a series of new
regulations set to take effect in 2011 that, although applicable to all public
and private colleges and universities, are meant to curb the latest surge in
abusive business practices in the for-profit sector. One set of rules
eliminates “safe harbor” exceptions to bans on tying compensation to
recruitment success. 257 The most hotly contested proposal concerned
revisions to the “gainful employment” rule, which requires FPIs to
demonstrate that they are adequately preparing their students for the
workforce. 258 The revised rule employs a two-part test that considers both
the percentage of borrowers repaying their federal student loans, as well as
the relationships between total student loan debt and average earnings. 259
251. See Hirsch, supra note 25, at 824–25.
252. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(3) (2006). See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6,
at 172.
253. See Hirsch, supra note 25, at 827.
254. § 1002(a)(3). See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6, at 177.
255. Id.
256. See Kelly Field, Senate Hearing on For-Profits to Feature Video of
Government Undercover Investigation, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 29, 2010),
http://chronicle.com/article/Hearing-on-For-Profits-to/123716.
257. See Field & Gonzalez, supra note 1844.
258. The Higher Education Act of 1965 requires proprietary and vocational
colleges to provide “an eligible program of training to prepare students for gainful
employment in a recognized occupation.” See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2008);
see also Gonzalez, supra note 17.
259. The rule was vigorously contested by for-profit lobbyists, who were not
in favor of a “metrics-based” approach to measure “gainful employment,” and
spent “hundreds of thousands of dollars” to lobby for rules that instead require
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Under the rule, student loan dollars cannot be used at FPIs when graduates
of the institutions carry debt loads that exceed thirty percent of
discretionary income, and twelve percent of total income, and where less
than thirty-five percent of former students are paying down the principal on
their loans. 260
Designed to specifically address problematic loan-default rates, an
additional rule makes any college or university ineligible for federal
student aid programs where, for three consecutive years, thirty percent or
more of its borrowers default within three years of their scheduled
repayment start, or where the institution’s default rate exceeds forty percent
in the most recent three-year period. 261 Less contentious rules mandate
disclosure regarding accreditation status and retention, graduation, job
placement, and debt burden rates; 262 require colleges and universities to
evaluate the validity of student high-school diplomas; and strengthen the
Department of Education’s ability to address deceptive advertising,
marketing, and sales practices.263 These regulations can give students more
of the information they need to make a decision regarding the value of
enrollment, thereby remediating some of the information asymmetries that
exist in the for-profit market.
The ability of regulations, however, to effectively stamp out fraud and
abuse in the market is ultimately limited. In an effort to ensure that
regulation in the for-profit sector is minimized, FPIs have challenged the
authority of the Department of Education to promulgate the new rules.264

more disclosures to students about graduates’ salaries and debt levels. See Kelly
Field, Education Department Takes Aim at For-Profits With Student-Debt Rule,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 23, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/EducationDepartment-Takes-Aim/123655; Field & Gonzalez, supra note 1844.
260. See Field, supra note 259.
261. See Jeffrey Brainard, For-Profit Colleges Face Risk Under New Rule,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 11, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/For-ProfitColleges-Face-Risk/66215.
262. See Nick Anderson & Daniel de Vise, Plan Wants Stricter Oversight of
For-Profit College Claims, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A2; Field & Gonzalez,
supra note 184; Gonzalez, supra note 17.
263. See Field & Gonzalez, supra note 1844. It has also been suggested that
the Department of Education should increase oversight of eligibility requirements
put in place to demonstrate that student borrowers have the ability to succeed in
school before receiving federal loans. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE
FEDERAL STUDENT AID 22–28 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d09600.pdf.
264. In January of 2011, for-profit institutions filed suit, challenging the
authority of the Department of Education to regulate the institutions in the ways
proposed by the new rules, and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. See
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And, even assuming that authority is affirmed, the substance and stringency
of legislation, as well as enforcement priorities, are all subject to political
whims and changes in administration. The shift in enforcement priorities,
for example, at the start of the second Bush administration regarding
incentive compensation, or the unwillingness of the Department of
Education to interpret provisions of the Higher Education Act in ways that
maximize relief in the form of loan discharge for those students who are
enrolled under false pretenses by a for-profit school, 265 both reflect these
types of political changes. Rules that better protect students today can be
pushed back, repealed, or interpreted more narrowly after today’s lobbying
effort or tomorrow’s election. 266
More problematically, many of the rules will also likely prove
ineffective. Attempts to address quality by mandating disclosure, for

Complaint and Prayer for Relief, Career Coll. Assoc. v. Duncan, (D.D.C. filed Jan.
21, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00138-RMC), 2011 WL 182900.
265. The Department of Education’s narrow interpretation of the False
Certification Rule limits loan discharge under the rule to only those students who
were admitted absent a high school diploma. See Stephen Burd, Relief Needed for
Career College Students Who Have Been Tricked into Enrolling in Unaccredited
Programs, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, HIGHER ED WATCH, (June 28, 2011)
http://higheredwatch.newamerica.net/node/53985. A broader interpretation would
encompass those students who, despite having a diploma, were nevertheless
admitted under false pretenses. Id.
266. FPIs were “rooting” for Republicans in the 2010 mid-term elections
because Republican gains might ease the pressure on the for-profit sector. See
Kelly Field, For-Profit Colleges Hope for Republican Gains, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (D.C.), Nov. 5, 2010, at A22; Stephen Burd, Three Steps House Repubs May
Take to Shield For-Profit Colleges, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, HIGHER ED
WATCH, (Nov. 10, 2010), http://higheredwatch.newamerica.net/blogposts/2010/
three_steps_house_republicans_may_take_to_shield_for_profit_colleges-39779
(detailing the “power position” of House Republicans in protecting FPIs’
interests). In February, two Republican congressman offered amendments to the
2011 spending bill that would block the Department of Education from using any
federal funds to enforce the gainful employment rule. See Kelly Field, Lawmakers
Seek to Block Enforcement of ‘Gainful Employment’ Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Lawmakers-Seek-to-Block/
126369/. By December of 2011, after a lobbying effort described by Department
of Education officials as one of the most intense they had seen, the regulatory plan
intended to crack-down on the for-profit higher education sector was significantly
weakened. Ultimately, the final standards affected a maximum of 5 percent of
schools in the sector, whereas original standards would have affected 16 percent.
In addition, the start date for implementation of penalties was pushed back from
2012 to 2015, while a focus on disclosure was emphasized in the meantime. Eric
Lichtblau, With Lobbying Blitz, For-Profit Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011. Disclosure, of course, does little to ameliorate abuse. See
infra, note 267, 272, and accompanying text.

2011]

PREDATORY ED

91

example, do not account for the failure of disclosure rules to ensure that
recipients of the disclosed information make better decisions. 267 This
concern is heightened in the context of students who are more likely to
have been undereducated, and thus lack the financial and educational
literacy necessary to understand the disclosed information they receive.
These students also lack the alternative higher education opportunities even
if the disclosed information does give them pause, and are further
susceptible to certain psychological triggers that detrimentally affect their
decisionmaking.
In mortgage lending, for example, potential African-American
homeowners are plagued by misinformation and myths regarding the
home-buying process, putting them at a disadvantage relative to the rest of
the market despite the voluminous amounts of disclosure required at
closing. 268 Furthermore, the unique history of exclusion from credit and
ownership markets to which certain groups are subject also has a
psychological effect, resulting in decisions that deviate from those of the
socioeconomically and educationally privileged on which experimental
research on decision-making is typically conducted. 269 Minorities, those
with less education, or those with low income, may be likely to display
unwarranted trust in their mortgage brokers or lenders because their fear of
an unequal outcome makes them vulnerable to illusions of equality, such as
being treated with superficial respect.270 Similarly, fear of discrimination
also negatively impacts decision-making. This fear can invoke stress,
which impairs decision-making and also encourages subjects to engage in
avoidance, thus restricting their activities in the transaction. 271 Finally,

267. See Paula Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure As A Regulatory
System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1113–19 (2007) (discussing the structural
and cognitive impediments to effectively using disclosure to regulate). See also
Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (criticizing the efficacy of notice in product liability);
Lauren Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006) (criticizing regulation
through notice in lending); Debra P. Star & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and
Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage
Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85
(2010) (chronicling the social and psychological phenomena that limit the
effectiveness of disclosure, including user-unfriendly disclosure forms, lack of
contractual schemas, and social norms and signals that discourage careful reading
of disclosures).
268. See FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE
MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 9 (2002), available at http://www.fanniemae.
com/resources/file/research/housingsurvey/pdf/survey2002.pdf.
269. See Willis, supra note 2677.
270. See Star & Choplin, supra note 267, at 104.
271. See Willis, supra note 2677, at 759–61.
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disclosure requirements do little to address social norms that discourage
careful and close reading of disclosures. 272
Many of the proposed rules also focus exclusively on outcomes, and as
such may have unintended consequences on those NPIs with graduates
unable to find work despite having received a legitimately rendered
education, free of fraud or misrepresentation. 273 The proper inquiry is not
whether students are steadily employed after graduation, but rather
whether, in pursuit of profit, FPIs knowingly and unethically recruit and
enroll students for programs that will neither serve the student nor the
public—and whether the sector’s incentive to do so can ever be
successfully managed. 274
Problematically, the 90/10 rule sets an arbitrary cut-off for federal
funding without any support for the proposition that educational quality is
guaranteed if students are willing to use their own money to finance it. The
refusal to use personal funds to finance education does not necessarily
indicate inferior quality, just as the willingness to use personal funds does
not necessarily indicate superior quality. At the same time, the rule takes
for granted that public funds are used to fund all but ten percent of
programs that don’t serve the public good, in a market prone to failure.
Furthermore, both the compensation and gainful employment rules allow
predatory behavior to continue in the sector, provided that long-term
consequences of that behavior are kept in check. As long as compensation
at FPIs is not explicitly linked to recruitment, or as long as enough students
have not fallen into loan default, problematic business practices can
continue unabated with the help of public dollars.
Finally, and most importantly, current state and federal legislation
attempts to reduce abuse without ever addressing the underlying causes of
that abuse. Consumer protection regulations are most effective when
violations can be clearly identified—“cases in which actions rather than

272. See Star & Choplin, supra note 267, at 104–05.
273. According to the president and CEO of the National Black Chamber of
Congress, if the gainful employment rule was applied to Historically Black
Colleges and Universities, ninety-three percent would fail because of unacceptable
repayment rates. See Alford, supra note 219.
274. One proposed solution that has not yet gained much traction is to require
for-profits to shoulder some of the loss when their graduates default on student
loans. Although it is conceivable that such a solution would temper aggressive
recruiting practices at FPIs, other proposed solutions—including the gainful
employment rule—similarly use the threat of financial penalty to influence FPIs’
business practices. As with the other proposed solutions, however, it is not clear
that such a solution would do anything more than temper problematic business
practices, especially considering the significant profit incentives that likely remain
even after a default penalty is imposed. Moreover, such a proposal does nothing to
address the normative issues raised by this paper.
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motives are at stake.” 275 Education, however, is an “experience good,” 276
difficult to regulate because assessment of the action—educating—is
complicated, and a motive—the for-profit motive—is precisely what needs
to be constrained in the market. Moreover, the difficulty in concretely
measuring the “output” of education makes it unlikely that a for-profit
structure, often tied to objectively verifiable targets and benchmarks, can
incentivize for-profit managers to pursue social good in the education
context. And, unlike other goods where consumers can quickly determine
whether they have paid too much, information asymmetries and valuation
problems linger even after initial education delivery. Although students
may suspect, ex post, that a for-profit motive undermined the quality of
their education, or subjected them to unethical recruitment, consumer
protection laws neither provide relief nor change the nature of the good. 277
Suits in tort or contract are similarly unsuccessful.278
ii. Regulatory Bodies
Regulatory bodies also have a role to play in changing the for-profit
sector. In the United States, private agencies are largely responsible for
determining whether institutions of higher education meet minimum
standards of quality education. 279 The private agencies are in turn
recognized by the Department of Education and the Council for Higher
Education Accreditation, a private nongovernmental institutional
membership organization that monitors the capacity of accrediting
bodies. 280 Institutional accreditors, including the Accrediting Council for
Continuing Education and Training, and the Council on Occupational
Education, are responsible for accrediting for-profit, career-based,
275. James R. Hines et al., The Attack on NonProfit Status: A Charitable
Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1212 (2010).
276. See Andreas Ortmann, How To Survive in Postindustrial Environments:
Adam Smith's Advice for Today's Colleges and Universities, 68 J. HIGHER EDUC.
483, 486–91 (1997) (explaining that education is a service subject to qualityassessment problems).
277. See Hines, et al., supra note 275, at 1212 (making a similar argument
regarding for-profit charities).
278. See supra notes 1977–199 and accompanying text.
279. See U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., COLLEGE ACCREDITATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/index.html; JUDITH S. EATON,
ACCREDITATION AND RECOGNITION IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2008).
280. See U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., supra note 277; EATON, supra, note 277, at 23.
The National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity held a
series of meetings in early 2011 to discuss changes to the nation’s accreditation
system, including a greater federal role in the accreditation process. See Eric
Kelderman, Advisory Panel Hears Concerns as It Again Considers Changes in
Accreditation, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 3, 2011), http://chronicle.com/
article/Advisory-Panel-Hears-Concerns/126251.
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institutions, 281 although the extent to which their accrediting process can
effectively weed out schools that employ problematic recruiting and
business practices is legitimately in question. 282 In states that specifically
make it a violation of consumer protection statutes to operate without
accreditation, suits can be brought against FPIs that improperly award
degrees. 283
To address issues of quality in higher education, accreditors might use a
qualifications framework. Suggested by some scholars, the framework is a
statement of learning outcomes and competencies a student must
demonstrate in order to be awarded a particular degree.284 Such a
framework would enable students to determine what a particular degree
represents to employers, and allow employers to understand which skills
and knowledge a person possesses as a result of having been awarded a
particular degree, 285 all the while lessening employer and student
dependence on numeric credits that are not always transferable.286 Similar
to mandatory disclosure laws, such a proposal would address information
asymmetries in the market by arming individuals with more information
about their choices, without placing an additional burden on the
government to regulate the quality of for-profit education. 287
In addition to accreditation, regulatory entities can also have a stronger
monitoring presence. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has the
authority to bring enforcement actions against FPIs that engage in
deceptive trade practices. Indeed, in 1988, the FTC adopted special rules

281. See EATON, supra note 279, at 11.
282. The Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of
Colleges and Schools, for example, was responsible for accrediting the
disreputable American InterContinental University. See Eric Kelderman, Under
Obama, Accreditors Are Still in the Hot Seat, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.),
Sept. 12, 2010, at A1. See also Field, supra note 171 (documenting doubts
expressed by senators regarding the rigorousness of an accrediting process that
does not detect fraud, as well as plans to review the financing structure of the
accrediting system for evidence of financial conflicts of interest).
283. See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 446E-3, E-5 (2006).
284. See Holiday Hart McKiernan & Tim Birtwistle, Making the Implicit
Explicit: Demonstrating the Value Added of Higher Education by a Qualifications
Framework, 36 J.C. & U.L. 511, 524 (2010).
285. Id. at 529–30.
286. Id. at 529, 533–34. Unfortunately, such a proposal would support the
tendency of some FPIs to award academic credit for on-the-job training or life
experience, as a focus on student outcomes and competencies contemplates
knowledge gained through non-academic means. Id. at 532–33.
287. Regulatory schemes using disclosure are part of a larger, and potentially
problematic, trend in American law to “inform and educate rather than regulate,”
while shifting the locus of decision-making away from the government and to an
individual in the market. See Dalley, supra note 266, at 1092.
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prohibiting for-profit vocational or distance learning schools from engaging
in misrepresentations of accreditation.288 Unfortunately, compliance with
the rules is voluntary, and FTC enforcement regarding unaccredited
schools has been a low priority. 289 Should regulation in this area become
an area of focus for the FTC, use of consent decrees by the agency has
potential to not only curb predatory behavior, but to also change the very
culture of the sector. 290
The failure, however, on the part of accrediting agencies and regulatory
bodies to identify institutions like American InterContinental University
lies, again, with difficulties evaluating the quality of education. And, like
with regulation, commitment to the terms of consent decrees is subject to
changing policy prerogatives of new administrations. 291 Finally, neither
accreditation nor increased regulatory activity does anything to address the
assessment difficulties in the sector, to remove the continual incentive for
predatory behavior posed by a for-profit motive, or to bring the sector in
line with our normative understandings of the purpose of higher education.

288. 16 C.F.R. § 254.3 (2010).
289. See Creola Johnson, Degrees of Deception: Are Consumers and
Employers Being Duped by Online Universities and Diploma Mills?, 32 J.C. &
U.L. 101, 143 (2005). In response to the low-priority status of enforcement in this
area, Professor Johnson proposes a new federal statute, entitled the “Authentic
Credential in Higher Education Act,” which would impose affirmative
accreditation disclosures on online schools and diploma mills, and establish
criminal penalties specifically for fake degree providers and unaccredited schools
that fail to meet those obligations. Id. at 155–56.
290. Consent decrees have been successfully used in antitrust, environmental,
health care, and school desegregation litigation. Moreover, to the extent that
consent decrees can address a wide range of business activity, they have the
potential to change the predatory culture in which many FPIs currently operate.
For example, in response to allegations that employers engage in racially
discriminatory hiring, consent decrees can restructure an employer’s entire hiring
process, including stipulations that address hiring criteria, training, promotion, and
firing procedures. See Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain:
Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform,
1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 893–94 (1984). Similarly, consent decrees in the for-profit
education sector might address legal, but misleading and unethical business
practices like excessively aggressive recruiting.
291. See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government
by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with
the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203 (1987) (exploring limits on judicial
authority to bind the policy discretion of the executive based on preexisting
consent decrees).
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C.The Problem Is In the Premises
Given improved regulation and assessment of the sector, there may yet
be a limited space for FPIs. FPIs have a particular proficiency in providing
training and degrees for skill sets that are easy to certify, benefit from
experienced practitioners, and require modest physical plant
requirements. 292 To the extent that FPIs are teaching “know-how” skills,
like dental assistance or blood bank technology, rather than “know-why”
skills, like economics or the fine arts, it may be easier to assess whether the
public good of education received at a FPI functions properly. 293
Ultimately, it is likely that ownership-related differences can and do affect
performance, and that addressing problems in for-profit education may best
be accomplished by identifying those areas where the for-profit motive is
least likely to compromise quality. 294
Higher education policymakers must identify those fields, industries,
and skill sets that are most amenable to testing and certification. For-profit
program offerings range from less-than-two year certification programs to
associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees. All of these
programs are ripe for inquiry into their appropriateness in for-profit
education. Research from the Department of Labor and public policy
centers should also be able to provide predictions on the direction of the
“new information and service economy,” 295 with insights as to those sectors
that will see stable, long-term growth that can legitimately benefit from a
labor-force trained at FPIs, and are thus least susceptible to economic
changes that trigger fraudulent behavior in the sector.296 This evaluation

292. See Sarah E. Turner, For-Profit Colleges in the Context of the Market for
Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT
UNIVERSITIES 51, 58–59 (David W. Breneman, et al., eds., 2006).
293. See TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6 at 126.
294. In health care, for example, differences in quality do appear in the
provision of uncompensated care. See Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 233.
295. See supra, notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
296. A report released by the Center for American Progress, for example,
found that FPIs focus on “support” occupations, like medical and dental assisting,
rather than “practitioner” and “technician” fields like registered nursing and
diagnostic technology, despite the reality that by 2018 the country is expected to
need an additional one million nurses, but only 218,000 more medical assistants.
JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN & ELLE-MARIE WHELAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
PROFITING FROM HEALTH CARE: THE ROLE OF FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS IN TRAINING
THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE 3 (2011), available at http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/for_profit_health_care.pdf. The focus on
support, rather than practitioner, occupations raises questions about for-profit
motivations in focusing on the former, as well as about the future of those students
trained for positions that offer not only less professional autonomy, but are also
ultimately un-needed. See Kelly Field, For-Profit Colleges Could Do More on
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process, moreover, might also be incorporated into current accreditation
procedures, withholding accreditation from those FPIs that award
certificates and degrees in fields unsuitable for a for-profit motive. 297
Beyond that, public funding for higher education should be restricted to
the nonprofit sector. NPIs are certainly not without their flaws, one of the
biggest being the sector’s failure to effectively maximize access for
underserved students. 298 Furthermore, due to both internal and external
constraints on NPIs, college and university matriculation continues to be
limited for low-income, first-generation, and minority students. 299
Internally, NPIs have been criticized for misalignment between cost
structures and revenue, owing, in part, to inefficient governing300 and
compensation structures, 301 academic ratchet, 302 administrative lattice, 303
Shortage of Health-Care Workers, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-Colleges-Could-Do/126004.
297. Suggestions regarding the accreditation process necessarily trigger
questions about the effectiveness of administrative agencies in regulating and
monitoring for-profit and nonprofit education. See Jennifer Alexis Knight, The
Federal False Claims Act and the Accreditation of Institutions of Higher
Education, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 777–78 (2011). Literature on the role of the
Department of Education, in particular, in addressing predatory behavior in higher
education is scare, leaving unanswered questions about the application of
administrative theories regarding public choice and public interest to the problems
which are the focus of this article.
298. See supra, notes 45–55 and accompanying text.
299. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION 73 (2005) (citing poor academic and social preparedness,
information deficits, and financial hardship as factors that limit college
opportunities for students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds).
300. Some literature indicates that the absence of course-by-course
contracting, as well as the presence of salaries and tenure at NPIs make nonprofit
faculty both unresponsive to the power of reputation and immune to incentives for
good teaching and curricular innovation present at FPIs. See e.g., Ortmann, supra
note 276, at 486, 490–91.
301. See, e.g., Andrea Fuller, Compensation of 30 Private-College Presidents
Topped $1-Million in 2008, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 14, 2010, at A1
(reporting on investigations into the high salaries of private college presidents
whose leadership was questioned). Although Malani and Posner theorize that
compensation structures at nonprofit organizations result in inefficiency, Hines,
Horwitz and Nichols respond that such an argument assumes that nonprofits only
pay their managers fixed salaries. To the contrary, with adequate safeguards, the
IRS does permit incentive compensation plans at NPIs. See HINES ET AL, supra
note 2755, at 1193–94. Moreover, Hansmann argues that even though NPIs may
succeed in distributing some of their net earnings in the form of inflated salaries, it
is still preferable to the efficiency losses to be expected as a result of a for-profit
motive. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 844–45.
302. Ratchet is the tendency for faculty to shift away from teaching, to student
advising, counseling, and governing tasks. See Andreas Ortmann & Richard
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and participation in the “college for all” movement that may be pushing
unqualified or marginally qualified students into liberal arts education
when they would be better served by vocational training. 304
Externally, however, decreasing state and federal financial support for
higher education is the primary reason for prohibitive tuition costs,305 while
waning public support for higher education generally is also to blame for
the inability of NPIs to broaden access. According to a report of the
Education Commission appointed by former Secretary of Education
Margaret Spellings, gaps in college and university access remain
significant for low-income Americans and ethnic and racial minorities,
even after controlling for college and university preparation. 306 Only
seventeen percent of Blacks and eleven percent of Latinos obtain
bachelor’s degrees by age twenty-nine, while thirty-four percent of whites
do so. 307 In 2001, sixty-five percent of whites sixteen to twenty-four years

Squire, A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the Administrative Lattice in Institutions
of Higher Learning, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 377, 378 (2000).
303. Administrative lattice is the tendency, over time, for the number of
administrators to grow relative to the number of faculty. Id. at 378.
304. See Wolf et al., supra note 105 (quoting analysis of Charles Murray that
the four-year model is wrong for a large majority of young people). Former House
Education and Labor Committee chairman William F. Goodling, for example, has
stated that “we’re overselling college: the four-year traditional conception of a
college education.” DAVID BOESEL & ERIC FREDLAND, NAT’L LIBRARY OF EDUC.,
COLLEGE FOR ALL? IS THERE TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON GETTING A 4-YEAR
COLLEGE DEGREE? 2 (1999). Similarly, former Labor Department Secretary
Robert Reich has stated that “too many families cling to the mythology that their
child can be a success only if he or she has a college degree.” Id. Other
researchers have concluded that students in the lower two-thirds of their graduating
high school classes may be better served by two-year programs leading to technical
degrees. Id. at 12–13. Moreover, the utility of liberal arts degrees, regardless of
ultimate career choice, is continually debated. Id. The purpose of this article is not
to substantively evaluate the value of a liberal arts degree vis-à-vis associate’s or
certification programs offered at FPIs and community colleges, although to the
extent that the latter programs train students in finite skill-sets that can easily
become obsolete and are also less likely to result in long-term job and income
stability, the disproportionate channeling of poor, working-class, and minority
students into the programs raise equity issues, to be discussed in future scholarship.
305. See infra, notes 311–314 and accompanying text. Between 1976 and
2004, the average tuition at public and private four-year institutions increased 732
and 693%, respectively. Donald E. Heller, Can Minority Students Afford College
in an Era of Skyrocketing Tuition?, in HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 56, at 83.
306. See TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra note 50, at 7.
307. Id. Census data reviewed by The Chronicle of Higher Education similarly
found that in 2009, twenty-eight percent of Americans twenty-five years of age
and older held at least a four-year degree. The rate for Black Americans and
Hispanic Americans, however, was just seventeen and thirteen percent,
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of age had enrolled in a college or university, compared to just fifty-five
percent of African-Americans and fewer than fifty percent of Hispanics. 308
These gaps in access are often due to lack of financing, as matriculation at
traditional institutions of higher education remains closely correlated with
economic status. Low-income high school graduates who perform in the
top quartile of standardized testing attend colleges and universities at the
same rate as high-income graduates who perform in the bottom quartile on
the same tests. 309 In 2003, only fifty-four percent of high school graduates
from the lowest income quartile enrolled in a college or university,
compared to eighty-two percent of high school graduates from the top
income quartile.310
Limitations in access are further restricted by public policy that has
started to “view[…] higher education as more of a private benefit than a
public good,” as indicated by dwindling state and federal funding of higher
education programs, 311 the transformation of a grant-based federal loan

respectively. Alex Richards, Census Data Show Rise in College Degrees, But Also
in Racial Gaps in Education, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 28, 2011, at A24.
308.WILLIAM BOWEN ET AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 75–76 (2006). The minority enrollment gap, of course, is largely due
to the fact that minority students are more likely than other students to come from
low-income families. College access is also impacted by academic preparation,
with the effect of secondary-school quality having a particularly strong effect on
bachelor’s degree attainment for African-American and Latino students.
Unfortunately, low-income and minority students are significantly more likely than
white students to attend underfunded, understaffed, socially and economically
isolated secondary schools. See Derek V. Price & Jill K. Wohlford, Equity in
Educational Attainment, Racial Ethnic, and Gender Inequality in the 50 States, in
HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 56, at 64. Cumulatively, these inferior academic
experiences result in poor standardized test performance for minority students, if
they are encouraged to take the tests at all. See BOWEN ET AL., supra note 308, at
79–84.
309. See TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra note 50, at 9.
310. BOWEN, supra note 308, at 74 (quoting College Board findings).
311. Erin Oehler, The Door to Higher Education: Accessible to All? Whether
State-Funded Merit-Aid Programs Discriminate Against Minorities and the Poor,
10 SCHOLAR 499, 536 (2008) (quoting William Kirwan, Chancellor of the
University of Maryland System) (citing public policy change as reason for the
emphasis shift in college and university admissions from access to competition).
Contrary to popular public suspicion, there is no relationship between the
availability of financial aid and the increasing price of higher education. Rather,
the cost driver is decreasing state appropriations and grant revenues for higher
education even as higher education costs increase. See THOMAS J. KANE, THE
PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING HOW AMERICANS PAY FOR COLLEGE 5 (1999).
In 1980, state and local appropriations paid for seventy-six percent of the cost of
education at the institutions; by 2000, that percentage had dropped fourteen points,
resulting in tuition increases and a sixty percent increase in the share of costs paid
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system into a loan-based system, and the rise of state merit-based
assistance programs. Increasing cuts to state and federal budgets
supporting higher education have lead open-access campuses to limit
enrollment or, in some cases, to close their doors. 312 Moreover, movements
to curb or completely eliminate admissions and financial aid affirmative
action programs have further undermined access for marginalized student
groups to colleges and universities.313 Add to this brew the positional arms
race of college and university rankings that seek to order, in an overly
simple way, that which is complex and nuanced, and it is no wonder that
NPIs have not embraced the sort of changes 314 that would broaden access
for underserved students. As a result, the equal opportunity ideals
undergirding higher education in the United States are fading, denying
access to poor, working class, and minority students in greater numbers. 315
for by students and their families. Id. The single overriding factor related to tuition
increases at public four-year colleges and universities, for example, has been
decreasing state appropriations. See ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., Study of
College Costs and Prices: 1988-89 to 1997-98, 4 EDUC. STATS. Q., Spring 2002, at
47, 51 fig. D. Similarly, community colleges that have historically received higher
proportions of their revenue from state and local taxes than four-year institutions
are increasingly relying on student tuition, to the detriment of their access
missions. See Eric Kelderman, As State Funds Dry Up, Many Community
Colleges Rely More on Tuition Than on Taxes to Get By, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (D.C.), Feb. 11, 2011, at A20. As indication of today’s climate regarding
government support for higher education, the bill proposed by House Republicans
for the 2011 fiscal year cut Pell Grant amounts by fifteen percent. See Kelly Field,
House Republicans’ Spending Bill for 2011 Would Cut Pell Grant by 15 Percent,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 13, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/HouseRepublicans-Spending/126356/. Mainstream acceptance of FPIs is not surprising
given the backdrop of a shift in public support for education.
312. See Jennifer Gonzalez, At the White House, Praise and New Challenges
for Education’s ‘Unsung Heroes’, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 5, 2010, at A23
(noting that some community colleges have had to cap enrollments); Gonzalez,
supra note 127 (reporting that at Miami Dade College, 30,000 students were
unable to take needed classes because the college did not have money to hire
enough faculty members, and that community colleges in California had to reduce
enrollment by 250,000 because of cuts to state aid).
313. For a more detailed discussion of movements to eliminate admissions and
financial aid affirmative action programs, see LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON
DIVERSITY: AN ORGANIZED CHALLENGE TO RACIAL AND GENDER JUSTICE (2003);
Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of MinorityTargeted Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851 (2010).
314. Changes might include decreasing reliance on admissions criteria that
correlate with race and class, adopting scheduling flexibility for students with work
and family obligations, and making campus more hospitable for older students and
veterans.
315. See Michael Mumper, The Future of College Access: The Declining Role
of Public Higher Education in Promoting Equal Opportunity, 585 ANNALS AM.
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The diversion of limited federal loan resources to FPIs only compounds
the problems of the nonprofit sector and provides incentive for abuse in the
for-profit sector, while the effect of the abuse on students reinforces social
stratification that higher education is supposed to ameliorate. Despite
flaws, the obstacle to direct profiteering from student funds at NPIs
nevertheless results in lower rates of fraud and abuse; 316 not only do
nonprofit managers at institutions of higher education have more altruistic
motives than for-profit managers, 317 but the absence of a profit motive also
eliminates a major incentive for higher education producers to exploit
vulnerable market participants.
Furthermore, NPIs remain committed to the historical and contemporary
goals of higher education. Indeed, the absence of an obligation to pursue
practices that maximize wealth frees NPIs to pursue initiatives that do not
necessarily result in more revenue, but nevertheless foster service, charity,
civic participation, and self-actualization, all while broadening access for
students. Finally, NPIs embody what should be our society’s normative
commitment to higher education, exemplified best by a historical
commitment of government to low public college and university tuition, 318
and the dedication of our Founding Fathers to higher education, not in
pursuit of profit, but in pursuit of maximizing the public good. In contrast,
FPIs are not only problematic because of the difficulties in regulating the
predatory incentives in the market, but also because the for-profit business
structure in education is an abdication of the values of altruism, collective
responsibility, and pursuit of a common good. In the for-profit higher
education sector, the problem is in the premises.
CONCLUSION
Scholars assessing problems in the for-profit education industry take for
granted that the use of federal funding in the sector is appropriate. This
article’s goal, however, is to challenge that very assumption. Given the
public good nature of higher education, and the limitations of the for-profit
sector in providing it, we must consider whether a for-profit motive is
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 97 (2003) (arguing that public higher education may
ultimately play the role of reinforcing and widening the nation’s income
distinctions).
316. In 2004 testimony before Congress, former inspector general of the U.S.
Department of Education testified that “while fraud and abuse does occur at
nonprofit and public-sector institutions, historically, fraud and abuse
predominantly involves proprietary schools.” See Freedman, supra note 168. He
continued by noting that in the previous six years, nearly three-quarters of fraud
cases came from the for-profit education sector. Id.
317. See Pusser, supra note 117, at 32; EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note
11, at 72.
318. See Mumper, supra note 315, at 100–01.
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appropriate in the context of higher education at all. FPIs have entered the
“mature but growing market of older nonprofit and public institutions,”319
and have seemingly achieved mainstream acceptance.320 Nevertheless, the
goal should not be to treat NPIs and FPIs similarly, for their motivations
and goals are not the same. FPIs are motivated to maximize profit, because
their ultimate obligation is not to students, but to investors.
Defenders of the private market for education may argue that market
forces will take care of the bad actors. According to the argument, those
institutions that engage in unethical recruiting practices, or who have poor
retention, graduation, and job-placement rates, will attract fewer and fewer
students as their reputations become more widely known. Even assuming
student choice, however, information asymmetries, the experience-rich
aspects of education, and insufficient or ineffective avenues for legal
redress all undermine the corrective abilities of the market. In the
meantime, in exchange for the financial benefits that go to shareholders of
FPIs, the public has endured fraud and abuse at the expense of students,
taxpayers, and the public good.
Questions do remain about the internal and external constraints of the
nonprofit sector. The nonprofit higher education sector, however, is
notably lacking the fraud and abuse prevalent in the for-profit sector. In
addition, its graduates complete their educations without taking on as much
debt as is incurred by for-profit students, and its goals and outcomes are in
line with the public benefit purposes of higher education. Federal funding
that is currently spent to maximize shareholder profit at FPIs would be
better spent at NPIs with missions that include service to the public, and in
the implementation of programs and initiatives that will improve access for
all students to traditional institutions of higher education. Accordingly,
outside of those limited areas identified as suitable for for-profit education
and effective monitoring and regulation, FPIs’ access to the federal loan
program should be prohibited.

319. TIERNEY & HENTSCHKE, supra note 6.
320. Jack Welch, the former General Electric Executive, owns a stake in forprofit Chancellor University in Cleveland; Goldman Sachs owns thirty-eight
percent of the for-profit Education Management Corporation in Pittsburgh; and
former President Bill Clinton took a position as honorary chancellor of Laureate
International Universities, owned by the for-profit Laureate Education. See
Golden, supra note 1, at 63. Similarly, retired and current leaders in higher
education and NPIs increasingly serve on the boards of the publicly traded
companies that own for-profit colleges and universities. Kelly Field & Paul Fain,
On For-Profit College Boards, Knowledgeable Insiders, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.
Feb. 18, 2011, at A14. Acceptance of for-profit principles among education is also
reflected in the rhetoric of K–12 public education reform, which has shifted from
achievement, equity and fundamental rights to efficiency, cost-savings, and
compensation.
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To educate the niche student markets that FPIs have been attracting,
state and federal governments should consider providing incentives for
NPIs to better educate marginalized students.321 In addition to providing
traditional liberal arts curriculums, NPIs can be further encouraged to
provide vocational education in the form of secondary and postsecondary
public and nonprofit programs. 322 Initiatives like these can ensure that
NPIs provide the flexibility and focus on career and technical education
that they have been lacking.
Proponents of the market can consider this proposal a market solution of
sorts. After all, enabling NPIs to better serve the vulnerable students
currently recruited by FPIs creates a more competitive market for the career
and vocational training FPIs currently purport to provide. In the meantime,
public money will be spent at institutions that have been, and will continue
to be, committed to the public good.

321. Such initiatives have been proposed before. Although ultimately gutted,
the Obama administration proposed a $12 billion program for community colleges
to improve remedial education, increase the number of transfer students from twoyear to four-year colleges and universities, create stronger ties between colleges
and employers, improve job-training, and provide online courses for students. See
Jennifer Gonzalez, Historic White House Summit to Put Community Colleges in
the Spotlight, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 5, 2010), http://chronicle.com/
article/White-House-Puts-Community/124816.
322. Vocational education has had a long history in the United States, starting
in the form of apprenticeships in the early colonial period. Land-grant institutions
continued this tradition, with an early mission of training farmers and homeeconomists. Today, vocational training is offered at high schools, training centers,
and two and four-year colleges and universities, although the future of the
programs is dependent on strong federal commitment. For a more detailed
discussion of vocational training in the United States, see GORDON, supra note 98,
at 34–46; ARTHUR F. MCCLURE, ET AL., EDUCATION FOR WORK: THE HISTORICAL
EVOLUTION OF VOCATIONAL AND DISTRIBUTIVE EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1985).
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